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MINIMIZING TAX CONSEQUENCES OF DEFERRED
PAYMENT SALES OF REAL PROPERTY SOLD ON
CONTRACT BY CASH-BASIS TAXPAYERS
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For various reasons it is commonplace to sell interests in real
estate by using some form of land sale contract whereby the seller
retains legal title to the property until all or most of the selling
price has been paid and the buyer goes into possession promising to
make stipulated payments over a period of time. These contracts
are denominated by various names such as "land contract," "contract of sale," "receipt and option," "lease and option to purchase,"
etc., but the general intention of the parties is to consummate a
sale of the property.
When a taxpayer contemplates a sale of real property to be effected by such a contract and a large taxable gain is involved, he is
usually concerned with the following questions:
(1) How much will be the over-all tax on the sale?
(2) When and in what amounts will the tax payments have to
be made?
(3) Who is entitled to the depreciation deduction?
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(4) What will be the tax consequences in the event of default
by the purchaser?
The scope of this article deals with sales of real property involving deferred payment contracts by cash-basis taxpayers only;
it would seem (although there is some conflict in the decisions)
that accrual-basis taxpayers would have to report the entire gain in
the year of the transaction unless the total sales price is contingent
or unknown, or the installment method of reporting gain is available under the circumstances.
HOW MUCH WILL BE THE OVER-ALL TAX ON
THE SALE, AND WHEN AND IN WHAT
AMOUNTS WILL THE TAX PAYMENTS HAVE TO BE MADE?
The answer to these questions will depend on whether the
gain is reported as a deferred payment sale or as an installment sale
under Section 453 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. In many
instances the use of the installment method will result in a lesser
over-all tax by reporting the gain proportionately over the years as
the payments are received instead of reporting the entire gain in
the year of transaction. This is so because the lower percentages
of the graduated tax rates are applied to only a fraction of the gain
on the sale each year instead of the higher percentage rates that
would apply if the entire gain was reported in the year of the transaction. However, the installment method of reporting gain is only
available if the initial payments received in the taxable year of the
transaction do not exceed 30 per cent of the selling price.
In this article, we wish to deal with the problem of a cashbasis taxpayer who has made a deferred payment sale to which the
installment sale provisions of the Code are not applicable or for
some reason he has not elected to so report the sale on his tax
return.
A specific illustration will show the tax consequences of a
sale of real estate using a deferred payment contract for which the
installment method of reporting gain is not available and yet similar tax savings are possible for a cash-basis taxpayer.
John Brown, a farmer, wishes to sell a tract of land and farm
buildings thereon for a price of $50,000. His adjusted basis for the
property is $25,000 and he has owned the property for a number of
years. Tom Smith, the buyer, is willing to pay the $50,000 -for the
property but is not certain of his future success as a farmer and
feels that $50,000 is a somewhat inflated price. However, he is
anxious to have the property and is willing to risk a $16,000 down
payment and some hard work. Brown and Smith execute a contract whereby title to the property is to remain in the seller until
the entire purchase price is paid, and the buyer is to get immediate
possession, pay $16,000 down and $3,400 annually thereafter for 10
years plus interest. The contract merely requires future payments
and no notes, mortgages or other evidence of indebtedness such as
commonly change hands in commerce are given as a part of the purchase price. If Smith defaults on his payments, he forfeits his
interest in the property but is not personally obligated for any un-
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paid balance on the contract. Since Brown received a down payment in excess of 30 per cent of the selling price, the installment
method of reporting the gain of $25,000 is not available. However,
if the current position of the United States Tax Court is followed
in subsequent cases, Brown can use a cost-recovery method and
report no gain on the sale until the down-payment plus annual payments exceed his cost basis of $25,000. After recovering his cost,
Brown will report the remaining installments as gain annually as
he receives them. Thus, there would be no tax on the money received in the year of the sale and for 2 years thereafter, $1,200 of
the $3,400 payment in the third year would be subject to tax, and
all of the remaining payments of $3,400 each would be reportable
as gain annually when received. Since these latter annual payments
would be afforded favorable capital gains treatment and would be
taxed over a period of years, much the same advantages are gained
by this method of reporting gain as are available under the installment method.
In analyzing this problem, the following sections of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 and supporting regulations are applicable:
Sec. 451 (a) "General Rule-The amount of any item of gross
income shall be included in the gross income for the taxable year in
which received by the taxpayer, unless, under the method of accounting used in computing taxable income, such amount is to be
properly accounted for as of a different period."
Sec. 1001 "Determination of Amount of and Recognition of Gain
or Loss.
"(a) Computation of Gain or Loss-The gain from the sale or
other disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount
realized therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section 1011
for determining gain, and the loss shall be the excess of the adjusted basis provided in such section for determining loss over the
amount realized.
"(b) Amount Realized-The amount realized from the sale or
other disposition of property shall be the sum of any money received
plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received."
Regulations 118, Sec. 39.44-4 "Deferred-payment sale of real
property not on installment plan:
"(a) ... the obligations of the purchaser received by the vendor
to be considered as the equivalent of cash to the amount of their fair
market value in ascertaining the profit or loss from the transaction.
"(c) If the obligations received by the vendor have no fair
market value, the payments in cash or other property having a fair
market value shall be applied against and reduce the basis of the
property sold, and, if in excess of such basis, shall be taxable to the
extent of the excess. Gain or loss is realized when the obligations
are disposed of or satisfied, the amount being the difference between
the reduced basis as provided above and the amount realized therefor. Only in rare and extraordinary cases does property have no
fair market value."
In construing the language of the above sections and regulations
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the courts have developed a doctrine applicable to cash-basis taxpayers selling property under deferred payment contracts that is not
entirely in accord with the Commissioner's views.
Recent decisions continue to be influenced by Judge Learned
Hand's opinion in Bedell v. Commissioner' written in 1929. The
question resolved in that case was the year in which income was
realized. Taxpayer sought to include income in the year of entering
into the contract which was 1919, whereas the Commissioner determined that income was realized in 1920, because performance
was uncertain and the closing date of the agreement was February
29, 1920. The Commissioner was upheld by United States Board of
Tax Appeals which was affirmed in Judge Learned Hand's opinion
in which he said, "To speak of the profit as resulting because its
amount can be presently ascertained, though performance remains
uncertain, seems to us a perversion of language." Later in the
opinion Judge Hand said, "But if land or a chattel is sold, and title
passes merely upon a promise to pay money at some future date,
to speak of the promise as property exchanged for the title appears
to us a strained use of language, when calculating profits under the
income tax. Section 202 (b) of the Act of 1918 provided for an exchange of property and made the profit depend upon "the amount
of its (the property received) fair market value, if any"-a phrase
which was amended in the law of 1921 (42 Stat. 227) to "readily
realizeable market value." There is a difference between the two,
but it is absurd to speak of a promise to pay a sum in the future as
having a "market value," fair or unfair. Such rights are sold, if at
all, only by seeking out a purchaser and haggling with him on the
basis of the particular transaction. Even if we could treat the case
as an exchange of property, the profit would be realized only when
the promise was performed."
A leading decision on the question was promulgated by the2 Tax
Court, April 5, 1950, in the case of Johnston v. Commissioner.
In this case a stockholder who employed the cash receipts
method of reporting income joined with other stockholders on December 28, 1942, to sell all of the stock of a corporation. Purchasers
deposited one-half of the estimated price of the stock with an escrow
agent. Balance of the purchase price was to be paid in 1943, after
certain events in 1943 determined the total purchase price by a
method prescribed in the contract. It was expressly provided that
1 30 F. 2nd 622 (2nd Cir., 1929).
• 14 TC 560 (1950).
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purchasers were not obligated to purchase any of the stock unless
all shares were sold to the purchasers in accordance with the contract. Petitioners here owned 5,588 shares out of a total of 224,806.
Petitioners sought to report their share of funds deposited with
escrow agent as realized in 1942, and the balance as realized in 1943.
The Commissioner determined that none of the gain was realized
in 1942, but all of the gain was realized in 1943, since petitioners'
share of the cash in escrow was not actually or constructively received by him in 1942, and the contract itself was not "property
(other than money)" or part of an "amount realized" in 1942, within the meaning of Section 111 (b). The Court said "the petitioner is
on a cash basis and to realize gain must receive during the taxable
year cash or its equivalent in excess of his basis before he can have
any taxable gain." (Emphasis added) .

the cash was not unquali-

..

fied subject to the demand of the sellers in 1942 and, therefore, was
under no circumstances income in 1942 to the petitioner on the cash
basis. The Commissioner would not hold a taxpayer to constructive
receipt of income under such circumstances, Regulations 111, Sec.
29.44-2, and the reverse is also true. Furthermore, even if petitioner
were right about his share of the cash, that alone would do him no
good, since his share of the $214,913.90 was less than his basis for
gain on his stock and he, on a cash basis, realized no gain until the
"amount realized" by receipt exceeds that basis. In conformity
with this case, it seems clear that a cash basis taxpayer who receives a deposit of over thirty per cent on a contract of sale, when
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such deposit does not exceed the taxpayer's basis of the property
being sold, has no income to-report, until the installment or deferred
payments received exceed his basis of the property which is the
subject of the contract.
Further decisions in the Tax Court involving this question were
promulgated, in 1951, in the Nina J. Ennis case 3 and in 1955 in the
Clarence W. Ennis case.4 Facts in these two cases were the same.
Nina J. Ennis and Clarence W. Ennis were cash basis taxpayers who
sold real estate known as the Deer Head Inn in 1945 for a down payment of $8,000, and a contractual obligation for monthly payments
over a period of years for the balance of the selling price, the total
price being $70,000. Sellers kept title to the property, and agreed to
deliver good and sufficient abstract and Warranty Deed and a Bill
of Sale, upon full performance by purchaser. The only security of
seller was a right to declare a forfeiture of purchaser, of all amounts
paid, in the event that purchaser did not keep up with payments as
provided in the contract. Purchaser received immediate possession
of the premises upon entering the agreement, but was to relinquish
possssion in event of default.
In the Nina J. Ennis case there was apparently no evidence introduced to show that such real estate contracts were marketable in
Michigan. The Court held that section ll (a) of the Internal
Revenue Code provides that "amount realized" shall be "any money
received plus the fair market value of the property, (other than
money) received." "This contractual obligation cannot be considered as "amount realized" unless equivalent to cash . . . To be
equivalent of cash, the requirement has always been that the obligation, like money, be freely and readily negotiable (emphasis added)
so that it readily passes from hand to hand in commerce." The Court
held that the only "amount realized" by Nina J. Ennis was cash
received as down payment and monthly installments.
The Clarence W. Ennis case involved the estate of the deceased
husband of Nina J. Ennis. Facts were here stipulated by the parties
that-land contracts such as the one herein involved, were commonly
used in the State of Michigan in virtually every land transaction in
which deferred payments are involved and had been so used for over
fifty years, and that such contracts are regularly sold, traded and assigned in the State, and numerous persons are engaged in buying
and selling them. Respondent here contended that the contract had
a fair market value in 1945 of 75% of its fair value and since it was
of a type which was freely assignable, bought and sold, it should be
included in 1945 as amount realized to the extent of 75% of its face
value. A prominent realtor who had been engaged in real estate
business for many years and who was also a director of two banks
in Lansing testified that he frequently bought and sold such contracts, but that he had never known a contract as large as this one
to be sold. He further indicated that this contract might have been
salable in 1945 if it were discounted as much as 50%. It was his
opinion that this contract was not a salable contract, and he estio 17 TC 465 (1951).
4 23 TC 799 (1955).
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mated the value of the property without a liquor license to be not
in excess of $20,000. The court held in this case that "even though
this contract was of a type which was regularly assigned in Michigan and passed from hand to hand in commerce, we are satisfied, on
the whole record, and have so found as a fact, that this particular
contract had no ascertainable fair market value in 1945." The court
concluded that the only amount realized by decedent in 1945 on sale
of the property was the amount of actual cash received in that year.
In the case of Hurlburt v. Comm. 5 filed March 21, 1956, tax-

payers sold on "receipt and option" forms three tracts of farm lands
in 1947. Each of these forms provided for a down payment upon
signing of the forms by both vendor and vendee. It was further
provided that installment payments be made on these "receipt and
opinions" for periods ranging from 10 years to 18 years. Two of the
agreements provided that one copy of the contract together with
abstract of title and warranty deed would be deposited with Citizens
National Bank, Akron, Colorado, and held until payments had been
made as agreed. The other form did not contain this provision, but
it was deposited in the same bank with abstract and warranty deed.
Purchasers all took immediate possession and there were no defaults in payment. The only security of sellers were the receipt and
option forms and a provision that buyers would in each case forfeit payments made if purchaser defaulted in payments provided for
by the receipt and option. Taxpayer reported no gain in 1947. Commissioner assessed a deficiency and included as "amounts realized"
the face value of unpaid installments in 1947, supporting his contention that the "receipts and options" had a fair market value in
1947 with the fact stipulated that the unpaid balances of these sales
were included in the Colorado Inheritance Tax return of deceased
husband as part of his estate as of date of death on October 22, 1948.
The Court said, "That evidence is without significance in determining whether the contracts had possessed a fair market value in the
hands of a cash basis taxpayer. Admittedly the contract rights were
assets in the deceased vendor's estate. As such, they should be
valued as of the date of death and this would be true even though
they were not the type of asset as would be includible in the income
5 CCH

Dec. 21, 637.
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of a cash basis taxpayer." The court also said, "When the contract
merely requires future payments and no notes, mortgages, or other
evidences of indebtedness such as commonly change hands in commerce, which would be recognized as the equivalent of cash to some
extent, are given and -accepted as-a part of the purchase price-it
creates accounts payable by purchasers and accounts receivable by
the sellers which those two taxpayers would accrue if using an accrual method.-But such an agreement to pay the balance of the
purchase price in the future has no tax significance to either purchaser or seller if he is using a cash system."
The decision in Haimovitz v. Commissioner6 was promulgated on
January 20, 1956. The Court there found "Agreement for Deed" and
"Lease with Option to Purchase" forms both were" freely and easily
negotiable and readily passed from hand to hand in commerce."
Therefore, the value of these documents was includible in the year
of sale as "amount realized." In this case petitioner had dealt extensively in real estate and frequently used one of the forms indicated above. There was uncontradicted and affirmative testimony
that such instruments were readily transferable, and in ordinary
course of commercial dealings these instruments were freely dealt
in at a discount of 10%. Therefore, the fair market value of 90%
should have been included as amount realized in the year of sale.
The Tax Court distinguished this case from the Ennis cases in that
the Ennis contract was not "freely and easily negotiable so that it
readily passes from hand to hand in commerce."
In the case of Wood v. Commissioner7, which was filed December 14, 1955, the question of profit realized on collection of deferred payment contracts purchased was involved. Petitioner purchased deferred land contracts at discount; he later collected installments and reported the discount gain as long term capital gain on
the theory of sale of a capital asset. None of the profits resulted
from sale of contracts. It was held that collection of installments
was not a "sale or exchange" and therefore the gain was not a
capital gain.
The net result of these cases appears to be that a cash basis
taxpayer can recover his cost before reporting gain where the prop6 T. C. Memo 1956-15; CCH Dec. 21, 529(M).
CCH Dec. 21, 377 (1956).
7 25 TC -------------
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erty is exchanged for a cash down payment and a contractual
promise to pay the balance in installments, where the contractual
promise is embodied in an instrument that is not freely and readily
negotiable so that it readily passes from hand to hand in commerce.
This seems to be true even if the promisor has adequate financial
resources and there seems to be no question as to ultimate payment
of the contract, if there is no readily realized market for the contract. This result appears to be entirely in accord with the concept
of permitting taxpayers to elect to report their income on a cashbasis method of accounting under which no consideration is given to
amounts earned until they are actually received.
Income is not reportable until received under the cash-basis
method of accounting, and a taxpayer does not realize income unless
he recovers an amount over and above the cost of the property sold.
Thus income to a cash-basis taxpayer would not be received until
after the recovery of his cost.
Any other conclusion would require the taxpayer to speculate
as to the value of the contract and report as present income money
he hopes to receive in the future, a concept in direct conflict with
the principles of cash-basis accounting. It seems to the writers that
the Tax Court has adopted a sound and practical view and one that
is fair to both the taxpayer and the government.
WHO IS ENTITLED TO THE DEPRECIATION DEDUCTION?
An additional question where the purchaser goes into possession
of the property but title remains in the seller by the terms of the
sales contract is which party is entitled to deduct depreciation on
buildings and improvements on the property that are used for business or income-producing purposes. Since the economic loss through
depreciation falls on the purchaser, he is the one entitled to depreciate the property; an equitable interest is sufficient to entitle
a person to the statutory deduction. Helvering v. Lazarus & Co.,
308 U. S. 252 (1939). An Internal Revenue Service ruling, I.T. 2275,
V-1 C B 62, provides in substance that the vendee of real estate
under a forfeitable executory contract of purchase is entitled to depreciation from the time possession and the burdens of ownership
are transferred to him, or when the deed passes, whichever occurs
first. But no depreciation is allowed the vendee prior to the transfer
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of possessions and the burdens of ownership. S.M. 1723, III-1 C B
163.
WHAT WILL BE THE TAX CONSEQUENCES
IN THE EVENT OF DEFAULT BY THE PURCHASER?
The final consideration when making a deferred payment sale
under an executory sales contract is the tax consequences of a default by purchaser and a repossession of the property by the
seller. Regulations 118, Sec. 39-44-4 (b) set forth the measures of
gain or loss when the vendor has retained title to the property as
follows: ".

. .

. The difference between (1) the entire amount of the

payments actually received on the contract and retained by the vendor plus the fair market value at the time of repossession of fixed
improvements placed on the property by the purchaser and (2) the
sum of the profits previously returned as income in connection
therewith and an amount representing what would have been a
proper adjustment for exhaustion, wear and tear, obsolescense,
amortization, and depletion of the property during the period the
property was in the hands of the purchaser had the sale not been
made will constitute gain or loss, as the case may be, to the vendor
for the year in which the property is repossessed." This regulation
was approved and followed in the case of Joseph Frost8 in 1938.
Alluding to the previous illustration of the sale of the farm from
John Brown to Tom Smith, assume that Smith decided after having
made the second payment of $3,400 that he couldn't successfully
operate the farm or continue the payments so he notified Brown he
was not going to make further payments on the contract and that
Brown could retake possession of the property. Assume further that
Smith had made improvements to the farm of the value of $2,000
as of the date of repossession and that Brown would have been entitled to deduct $1,000 depreciation during the period had the sale
not been made to Smith. The gain on repossession would be determined as follows:
Payments received on the contract
$16,000
D own paym ent --------------------------------------6,800
Installment payments (2 at $3,400)
Fair value of improvements placed
2,000
on the property by Smith
$24,800
Total
Less:
Profits previously returned
Nil
as income
Depreciation allowable
1,000
had the sale not been made $1,000
$23,800
Gain on repossession
A word of warning should be interjected here as to the character of this gain on repossession, i.e. whether this gain is to be
treated as capital gain or ordinary income. The regulations use the
term "gain or loss" implying that capital gain or loss treatment is
s 37 BTA 190 (1938).
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to be afforded items of this nature. The reasoning behind this
language in the regulations could logically be that the purchaser's
equitable interest is given up "in exchange" for a release from further obligation to the seller under the contract therefore subjecting
the transaction to capital gain and loss limitations. The contract
obligation in the hands of the seller is a capital asset and he acquires
the equitable interest of the purchaser in exchange therefor. However, the regulations also provide that where title has previously
been transferred to the purchaser under a deferred payment sale of
real estate and the purchaser defaults in his payment and the seller
accepts a voluntary reconveyance of the property in part or full
satisfaction of the unpaid balance of the contract, any excess of
the fair market value of the property over the unpaid balance of the
contract is ordinary income, not capital gain. The difference in the
treatment by the regulations of the gain on repossession when legal
title has passed and when title has not passed to the purchaser has
been criticized by the courts and textwriters and it is doubtful that
the treatment afforded by the regulations can be considered settled.
The gain or loss realized is in fact the same.
The basis of the property to Brown, after repossession, will be
his adjusted basis at the time of the original sale of $25,000 plus the
value of improvements made by Smith of $2,000 minus depreciation allowable bad the sale not been made of $1,000 or a new basis
of $26,000. The regulations do not specifically provide for the depreciation adjustment in the above computation, but it would seem
that it could not properly be omitted.
CONCLUSION
The use of the cost-recovery method by cash-basis taxpayers
selling property on contract as sanctioned by the courts is in conflict with the Commissioner's position stated in the regulations that
"Only in rare and extraordinary cases does property have no fair
market value." 9 The issue seems to have resolved itself into a question of fact as to when is the contract of sale on the deferred payment plan "freely and readily negotiable so that it readily passes
from hand to hand in commerce." If the contract is not freely and
readily negotiable the courts will permit a cash-basis taxpayer to
recover his cost before reporting any gain on the sale.
9 Section 39.44-4 of Regulations 118.
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When I was invited to speak to you, I was told that the state
of Colorado was in the process of considering the subject of judicial
reform and that this subject might interest you. At first, I hestitated because it seemed to me that my home state and city had
little to offer in the way of shining examples of progress in this
field. Upon further reflection, however, it occurred to me that because of the very fact that the judicial system of our state and city
leaves so much to be desired, perhaps I could be helpful if I brought
to you specimens, as it were, from a laboratory which nurtures
much that is archaic and bewildering in the way of judicial machinery.
In New York we have some 18 separate and distinct court systems, each of them exercising separate and, in most instances, exclusive jurisdiction over different types of causes. We have over
600 judges and 2,000 magistrates and justices of the peace. Until last
year we had no central administrative office for our courts that
could even collect accurate statistics. We could not even find out
what the courts were costing us, although we are now told that the
cost of our court system exceeds $68,000,000 per year. We have a
Civil Practice Act or Code of Procedure with nearly 1600 sections
followed by over 300 Rules of Practice which take up 115 pages
of fine print. This does not include our separate Code of Practice
for our Surrogates' Court. We have a jury calendar of personal
injury cases in New York City which is about three and a half years
behind.
Most of our judges are elected by popular vote except in the
case of certain local courts.
At one time New York was a leader in reform in the administration of justice. Once our Code of Civil Procedure was taken as a
model by other states. That was a long time ago. There has been
no real change in the structure of our court system in over a
hundred years, although our way of life has considerably changed
between the horse-and-buggy days and today when over four and
a half million automobile licenses are issued each year in New York
State alone and over one hundred thirty thousand automobile accidents occur annually.
I am glad to say we are currently trying to do something about
our machinery of justice. Some three years ago a special commission, known as The Temporary Commission on the Courts, was
created by our Legislature to study the whole problem. It consists
of four members of the Legislature and six distinguished members
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of the Bar of the state. Its appointment has stirred up considerable
public interest in judicial reform, particularly among the Bar and,
through the Bar, in some of our citizens. The reforms which
are especially needed with us include the simplification of our court
structure, the establishment of a central business administration
for the courts, the simplification of our Code of Procedure, and
lastly-and perhaps most important-a change in our method of
selecting judges.
The Temporary Commission on the Courts has done a most
painstaking job and it has come forward with two major recommendations, one of which relates to the establishment of a central
administration for all the courts in our state, and the other has to
do with the simplification of our court structure and the reduction
in the number of different types of courts. As a result of these
recommendations certain legislation has been enacted and a start,
although an inadequate one, has been made in establishing centralized administration. With regard to court simplification, the Commission has made sweeping recommendations which are still being revised and reconsidered but no specific proposal, either for
legislative or constitutional reform to carry them out, has as yet
been made.
Much to the disappointment of many of us the Commission has
found no substitute for the practice which prevails in most of our
courts of electing judges by popular vote. But we are determined
not to let this issue die.
The objective of all of us is, of course, the same, namely, to
secure a capable, honest, independent judiciary made up of men
and women of intellectual and moral integrity, judicial temperament and impartial outlook-beholden to no man-or at least to as
few as possible. How are we to find such a paragon?
Let us see how we do it in New York. A ballot used in New
York City in the election of November, 1954, is typical of the ballot
with which a voter in any district in Manhattan was confronted at
that election or with which he might be confronted at almost any
election.
Twenty-six vacancies in political offices from the Governorship
down had to be filled. Twenty-six levers had to be pushed down on
the voting machine if the citizen wanted to do his part in voting to
fill these vacancies and he had to choose from some 55 candidates.
The significant fact, however, is that 20 of these vacancies which had
to be filled were vacancies in judicial offices. If the voter wanted to
do his duty he had to vote for 20 judges and to choose them from
some 35 candidates.
The fact is, of course, that most of us who entered the polling
booth on Election Day knew nothing about any of the candidates on
the entire ballot except those for Governor and perhaps three or
four others. We pulled down the other levers in most instances
because they were opposite an Eagle or a Star and many of us left
the polling booth feeling rather ashamed and humiliated because
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we had voted mostly as robots and not as free men exercising an
intelligent, informed choice. Now you may be sure that the candidates for judicial offices were among those for whom we voted
automatically.
In order to ascertain whether our personal experience in this
respect was typical, some of us got together, including our Bar
Association and Sheldon Elliott's Institute of Judicial Administration, and caused a poll of voters to be taken within a few days following Election Day. A well known organization, skilled in making
such an investigation and study, was employed for this purpose.
Three separate samplings of the voting population were made-in
New York City, in the city of Buffalo, and in Cayuga County-in
other words, the largest city, an upstate city, and an upstate semirural community. The facts found fully confirmed what we all had
assumed from our own experience.
Most of the voters could not even recall the names of most of
the men for whom they voted in the judicial contest. Not more than
1% of the voters interviewed in either of the three localities could
remember the name of the distinguished jurist for whom they had
voted and who was elected as Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals
-the highest judicial office in the state. Not one person interviewed
in the city of Buffalo could remember for whom he had voted as
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals.
It is interesting to note that the poll which we took showed that
even in a semi-rural community where the ballot was much shorter
than in New York City, only 4% of the voters interviewed could
remember the name of any judicial candidate for whom they had
voted.
The method of electing judges directly by popular vote is, of
course, one that has great superficial appeal. It is subject to all the
familiar arguments which arouse popular emotions: Should not
the people be the choosers of those by whom they are to be judged?
Are not the people the best qualified to select the best candidates?
These and others like them are arguments which demagogic leaders
always find ready at hand. The fact is, of course, that certainly in
thickly populated communities these arguments for a popular election of judges are based on an entirely false premise. The premise
on which the successful operation of the democratic process must
always rest is that the people shall know something about the candidates for whom they are voting. Unless this is so, democracy becomes a pure mockery. Any impression that the people in such
communities choose their own judges is pure delusion and any assertion to that effect is pure fantasy. The act of choosing implies a
conscious act of the will. The voter does not exercise any real act
of choice when he pulls down the lever over the name of a man of
whom he has never even heard before he entered the polling booth
and whose name he cannot remember the day after he had voted
for him.
The ballot mentioned above is typical of the situation in our
community. Of the candidates for the 20 vacancies in judicial offices, most of the candidates were entirely unknown to most of the
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voters at the election. These candidates, chosen by the political
leaders of New York City, were in most instances unknown even
to most members of the Bar of the city. The most that the average
voter knew about the average candidate was possibly that he had
seen his photograph pasted on a billboard or in some shop window
under the party emblem. Under such conditions, any thought that
the people choose their own judges has no relation to reality.
To me this ballot is the best proof that you could find-by reductio ad absurdum--of the validity of the political philosophy
which stands for the "short ballot" and "responsible government."
This philosophy is based on what seems to me to be the self-evident
premise that only those offices should be elective which are conspicuous enough to attract public attention. If the office is one for
which the people will not take the trouble to inform themselves
with regard to the candidate, they should not be asked to make the
choice.
It is interesting to remember that the principle of the short
ballot is one that has been sponsored by leading statesmen of both
the great political parties. Woodrow Wilson headed the National
Short Ballot Association. He once stated: "I believe the short ballot
is the key to the whole problem of the restoration of popular government to this country."
In New York State in the roster of those who fought for this
principle we find such names as Charles E. Hughes, Theodore Roosevelt, Elihu Root, Alfred E. Smith, and Henry L. Stimson. I under-
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stand that the Governor of Colorado in his message to your Legislature in January, 1956, urged the adoption of the short ballot.
The logic and common sense behind the short ballot is peculiarly in point when it comes to electing judges-namely, that
voters should not be asked to vote on candidates about whom they
know nothing and as to whose qualifications they are not going to
take the trouble to inquire. The words of Charles E. Hughes, when
he was Governor of New York, in his Annual Message to the Legislature of 1910, are as apt in this situation as they were at that time.
He said:
The ends of democracy will be better attained to the extent that the attention of the voters may be focused upon
comparatively few offices, the incumbents of which can
be held strictly accountable for administration. This will
tend to promote efficiency in public office by increasing
the effectiveness of the voter and by diminishing the opportunities of political manipulators who take advantage of the
multiplicity of elective offices to perfect their schemes at
the public expense. I am in favor of as few elective offices
as may be consistent with proper accountability to the
people, and a short ballot.
The debate in New York on the principle of the short ballot
came to a focus in our Constitutional Convention of 1915 where the
short ballot was vigorously urged and sponsored by such statesmen as Elihu Root and Henry L. Stimson. Although the debate
there revolved around the short ballot with respect to executive
offices, it is striking how aptly the arguments made in favor of the
short ballot apply to the situation confronting us today in the
matter of selecting our judges.
Because the attention of the voters cannot be fixed on so many
candidates and because they are unwilling to take the trouble to
find out about them, the whole choice falls on the political leaders,
the bosses, or what used to be called the "invisible government."
No one has ever put it more effectively than Elihu Root speaking at
the New York Constitutional Convention in 1915 when he said:
Whether it be a president appointing a judge, or a
governor appointing a superintendent of public works,
whatever it may be, the officer wants to make a success,
and he wants to get the man selected upon the ground of
his ability to do the work. How is it about the boss? What
does the boss have to do? He has to urge the appointment
of a man whose appointment will consolidate his power and
preserve the organization. There has been hardly a day for
the last sixteen years when I have not seen those two
principles come in conflict. The invisible government proceeds to build up and maintain its power by a reversal of
the fundamental principle of good government, which is
that men should be selected to perform the duties of the
office, and to substitute the idea that men should be appointed to office for the preservation and enhancement and
power of the political leader. The one, the true one, looks
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upon appointment to office with a view to the service that
can be given to the public. The other, the false one, looks
upon appointment to office with a view to what can be
gotten out of it.
Judiciary offices are peculiarly fair game for the bosses. They
are often rich in patronage and the very fact that they escape close
scrutiny by the public offers a rare opportunity to the boss to run
a candidate subservient to his wishes. His wishes are usually, as
Mr. Root pointed out, the strengthening of his party organization
and his own political power rather than the true administration of
justice. If the judge becomes the boss's tool in the distribution of
patronage, it receives little public attention. The appointment by a
judge of his secretaries, receivers, guardians, and referees seldom
comes under public examination except in connection with the exposure of a public scandal.
The people of a democracy are neither able nor willing to inform themselves about a multitude of candidates. They can and will
inform themselves very thoroughly with regard to the candidates
for one or two important offices. With all the media for public information now available-radio, television, commentators and the
press-the people can learn about Ike Eisenhower or Adlai Stevenson running for President of the United States, or Stephen McNichols or Donald Brotzman running for Governor of the State of
Colorado, but the people are not interested and will not bother to
find out about Joe Doakes and Bill Jones, and maybe a dozen other
names which mean nothing to them, running for judge in a particular district.
It may be that in your state and particularly in some of the less
populated communities, conditions are different. It may be that
the judicial candidates in such areas are known to most of the
voters. The poll, which I referred to above, taken in New York
indicated, however, that even in the less thickly populated districts
the average voter took no interest in the judicial candidates.
You may say that people ought to take the trouble to inform
themselves about all candidates, including the judicial candidates.
You may say that the people ought to take the trouble to select
the kind of political leaders who truly represent their will. You
may say that the people ought to see to it that truly representative
and informed delegates to the judicial conventions are elected at
the primaries. You may say it is the people's own fault if they do
not do so.
Well, unfortunately we have to take the political facts of life
as we find them. We know that people do not take the trouble to
find out about all the candidates for whom they are asked to vote
and we know that the great majority of the people take little part
in the selection of their district leaders. There is too much else in
life to occupy them. Of all the candidates, the voters are least interested in the judicial candidates. The average voter does not
realize that he has anything but a very remote interest in the election of a good judge. The ordinary citizen very seldom comes in
direct contact with the courts. Too few of our citizens appreciate
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the wisdom of the words of George Washington which are inscribed on the portico of the New York County Courthouse-that
"The true administration of justice is the firmest pillar of good
government."
Let us see how independent and beholden to no one a judiciary
selected by popular election may be. Here again I bring you a
sample from the laboratory which we maintain in New York with
regard to judicial process. This sample is particularly interesting
because it comes from the lips of judges themselves. The judges I
refer to are the 22 judges on the City Court of the City of New York.
The City Court is second in importance only to our Supreme Court
with a civil jurisdiction up to $6,000 a year. These judges are elected
by popular vote. They receive a salary of $22,000 a year. This year
they asked the Legislature to increase their compensation to $25,000.
They submitted what I think you will agree is a most interesting
brief in support of this request. It is a frank and touching document.
They say that they need an additional $3,000 a year because they
have to go to so many hundred-dollar-a-plate dinners and because
they meet so many demands "for contributions and subscriptions to
various worthy causes in which ... former helpers are active participants." It is so significant that a few paragraphs from it deserve
quoting:
... In order for any candidate for elective office to win in a
county-wide contest, it is necessary for him to have solicited
and used active aid and cooperation of many organizations
and individuals: political, civic, religious, labor, fraternal,
social welfare, and many others. This means that after
ascending the Bench and as long as he remains on it the
City Court justice, like any other justice elected on a
county-wide basis, is met with demands for contributions
and subscriptions to various worthy causes in which his
former helpers are active participants. Frequently these are
demands which he cannot refuse and where pleading lack of
moriey is not accepted as a satisfactory excuse.
One of the most conspicuous examples of this is the
well-known hundred-dollar-a-plate dinner, many of which
occur in each year.
In one respect the need of the City Court justices to
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cooperate with former helpers is greater than that of the
other State-court jurists who are elected by the majority
votes of a county. The fact that a City Court justice may
be contesting at some future date for a place on one of these
other state courts compels him to answer many requests
which otherwise he could ignore.
This statement is almost naive in its frankness. But the fact
that his plight can be so frankly stated indicates that it is accepted
as a matter of course that a judge, after he ascends the bench, must
repay in tangible form for support which helped him get there
and that he must, while still on the bench, enlist by similar means
support for the future, having an eye to promotion to higher things.
If such is the pressure for money upon these judges, what must
it be for favors of other kinds? Surely this pressure at times must
seem intolerable. If there is one thing vital to sound government it
is an independent judiciary beholden to no man and administering
justice without fear or favor. A system which results in electing
men to the bench encumbered with a plethora of political obligations is destructive of first principles. To our shame these political
obligations have on occasion been found to run even in the direction
of leaders of the underworld. When a candidate, who has just been
nominated for an important judicial office, is recorded in an official
wiretap as saying to a leading gangster: "I want to assure you of
my loyalty for all you have done--it's undying", is it any wonder
that the people's confidence in the courts is shaken?
Is it any wonder that so many clients whose cases are about to
come to court believe, whether rightly or wrongly, that they will
receive favorable treatment only if they hire a lawyer who happens
to stand well politically with the judge? The mere fact that this
view is widely held, however unwarranted, shakes the public's confidence in our courts. No democracy can survive if the people lose
their respect for the law. Respect for the law cannot exist without
respect for the courts which administer the law.
The frankness with which these judges point to their impulse
to campaign for higher judicial office while on the bench is another interesting commentary on our system. It is interesting to
contrast this, for example, to the English system. Let me quote
from Lord Justice Denning of the English High Court of Appeal,
who came to visit us last summer as a guest of the American Bar
Association. He said in one of his addresses:
...

We have no system of promotion of judges in Eng-

land. Once a man becomes a judge, he has nothing to gain
from further promotion and does not seek it. The judges of
the Supreme Court are all paid the same, no matter whether
they sit to try cases at first instance or whether they sit in
the Court of Appeal.... A man who accepts the office of a

judge in England must reckon that he will stay in that
position always. He has taken it on as his life work and
must stand by it. This is the same whether he is a High
Court judge or a County Court judge or a stipendiary magistrate. Each normally stays where he is throughout his
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judicial career. The reason is that we think that the decisions of a judge should not be influenced by the hope of
promotion.
The alternative to the selection of judges by popular election is,
of course, to put the responsibility for their selection upon some officer elected by the people, whose office is sufficently conspicuous
to have enlisted the people's interest in his candidacy and whose
qualities the people have taken the trouble to appraise.
The appointive system of selecting judges is not a new and untried method. Let us not forget that the founders of our republic,
in drafting the Constitution of the United States, which has served
us well for all these generations, adopted the principle of the short
ballot, responsible government and an appointed judiciary. The
people vote for the President and Vice-President of the United
States. They do not vote for the Secretary of State, the AttorneyGeneral, the Secretary of Defense or any other member of the
Cabinet. The responsibility for the selection of his team is left to
the President, a candidate about whom the people are able to inform themselves. The selection of the Supreme Court of the United
States and all members of the Federal judiciary is also left to the
President.
The success with which the appointive federal judiciary system
has in general operated speaks well for the wisdom of our forefathers who adopted it. It is also a satisfactory answer to anyone
who might say that it contravenes the principle of the separation
of powers of the executive and judiciary. Surely no one was more
jealous of the principle of the separation of powers of these departments of government than the framers of the Constitution of the
United States, yet they provided for the appointment of the Federal
judges by the Chief Executive with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
The appointive system prevails in one form or another and in
respect to certain courts in seven states of the Union, namely, Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri
and New Hampshire. It prevails in a certain form in California.
In England judges are appointed. In fact, selection of judges by
popular vote is unknown, not only in any other English speaking
common law country, but elsewhere except in Soviet Russia and its
satellites.
I am interested to know that you in Colorado are considering
a proposed plan for the selection of judges along the lines of the
American Bar Association plan. It seems to me that a plan of this
nature bids fair to result in the selection of judges removed as far
from political considerations as any plan that has as yet been devised. Of course it is too much to expect that political affiliations
can be made never to play any part in a judge's selection, whatever
method be adopted. But surely it is not too much to expect that
political consideration shall be a minor consideration and that some
system may be found whereby qualifications for the job shall play
the really important part.
In 1945, a citizens committee which included most of the lead-
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ing lawyers in the City of New York was formed and adopted a
similar plan and actively sponsored it. In December, 1952, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York in open meeting approved the report of one of its committees which recommended a
plan of this nature for our district. A Special Committee on the
Administration of Justice approved of the same plan in November,
1955, and presented it to The Temporary Commission on the Courts.
But reform in this direction still meets determined opposition and
our plans have not yet come to fruition.
One of the things which we have learned in New York is that
the influence of the Bar alone is not sufficient to secure the enactment of the necessary legislation or constitutional amendment to
bring about reform. This seems curious in view of the fact that such
a large percentage of our legislators are lawyers. In order to move
them to act, however, it is essential to arouse public opinion generally. The conspicuous success that was had in New Jersey in court
reform was only brought about by an aroused citizenry outside of
the legal profession. This is not easy to accomplish because, as I
have said, the average citizen never comes into direct contact with
the courts and, therefore, only vaguely senses the underlying importance of a sound judiciary to his well being.
It is the members of the Bar who see the defects in our creaking
machinery but the trick is how to get them cured. There are so
many to whose best interest it is to keep things as they, are and this
includes elected judges whose influence politically is certainly not
negligible. Lawyers, moreover, have an understandable reluctance
not to offend judges who sit on the bench by suggesting that there
is anything wrong with our method of selection.
Appreciating these facts, we have in New York within the last
year or so organized a citizens committee known as the Committee
for Modern Courts. This committee includes among its membership
representatives of many of the leading organizations in the state
including women's organizations, labor organizations, chambers of
commerce, and the like. It has hardly had time to get started but
I believe its influence has already been felt in certain directions and
in connection with certain reforms.
But it is to members of our profession that we must look to
spark any substantial movement for reform in the administration
of justice. Only we lawyers are in a position fully to detect the
defects in our judicial machinery or fully to appreciate their importance. We must learn the art of gathering behind our banners the
throng of all right-minded peop]e in all walks of life. But it will
always be for the members of our profession in this area of statesmanship to head the procession and to carry the torch.
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In Rea v. United States,' petitioner was originally indicted in a
federal court for the unlawful acquisition of marihuana in violation
of a federal law. The indictment was based on evidence obtained
by a search warrant issued to a federal officer by a United States
Commissioner.
Rea moved under Rule 41 (e) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2 to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search warrant was improperly issued. The District Court granted the motion
and dismissed the indictment, although the evidence remained in
the possession of the federal officer.
After the suppression of the evidence, the officer swore to a
complaint before a New Mexico judge and caused a warrant for
Rea's arrest to issue. He was charged with being in possession of
marihuana in violation of state law.
Rea then moved in the District Court to enjoin the federal
agent from testifying in the state case.
It was conceded that the case against Rea in the state court
would be made by testimony of the federal agent based on the
illegal search and on the evidence seized under the illegal federal
warrant.
Relief was denied on the ground that the suppression of evidence in a federal court under Rule 41 and the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States applied only to proceedings
in federal courts and did not govern the use of that evidence in a
state court. Rea appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
176 S. Ct. 292, 350 U. S. 214, (1956).
2 18 U. S. C. A.
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The action denying relief was affirmed, Judge Huxman pointing
out:
The prohibition against the use of ((illegally seized)
evidence is limited to trials in the federal courts and there
only when it was unlawfully obtained by federal officers
or agents. It has consistently been held that .

.

. evidence

unlawfully obtained by federal officers may be used in state
trials ... 3

Referring to Stefanelli v. Minard,4 in which a state officer
sought to use evidence obtained in violation of the Federal Civil
Rights Act in a state proceeding, Judge Huxman alluded to the
"delicate balance between state and federal judicial systems" and
affirmed the principle adopted in the Stefanelli case, that "federal
courts should refuse to intervene in state criminal proceedings to
suppress the use of evidence even when claimed to have been secured by unlawful search and seizure."
Implying a recognition of the Tenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution, 5 he concluded that the effect of allowing the injunction would make impossible the prosecution by the state of its
action against Rea, and that "such an order would constitute an interference with the state judicial process."
Rea obtained certiorari, and Mr. Justice Douglas, for the majority (Douglas, Black, Frankfurter, Clark, and Warren) of the
United States Supreme Court put all constitutional question to one
side. Rather, he concluded, was this a case "concerning our supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies."
He added that "we have here no problem concerning the interplay of the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments nor the use
which New Mexico might make of the evidence."
In thus limiting what he perceived to be the issue, Justice
Douglas ruled:
The power of the federal courts extends to policing
those requirements (governing searches and seizures) and
making certain they are observed... To enjoin the federal
agent from testifying is merely to enforce the federal Rules
against those owing obedience to them ....

The obligation

of the federal agent is to obey the Rules.
On these bases the decision refusing the injunction was reversed.
Mr. Justice Harlan, for the dissenting four justices (Harlan,
Reed, Burton, and Minton), argued that the majority view departed
from the concepts which had theretofore governed state and federal
relationships regarding the problem of admissibility of illegally
seized evidence.
The majority decision was also questioned insofar as it held that
the "policing" of federal laws was a duty imposed upon the Court.
Said the dissent, "this is the first time it has been suggested that
" Rea v. United States, 218 F. 2d 237 (10th Cir. 1954).
472 S. Ct. 118, 342 U. S. 117, 96 L. Ed. 138 (1951).
5 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
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the federal courts share with the executive branch... responsibility
for supervising law enforcement activities as such."
While recognizing that the federal courts "undeniably have the
power to issue an injunction in a case such as this," the dissent concluded that the power should not be exercised in the factual situationtion presented in the Rea case. Drawing attention to the Stefanelli case and the delicate balance there referred to, Justice Harlan
pointed out that the injunction would stultify the state prosecution
as effectively as if it had been issued directly against the state or
its officials.
The dissent then considered the evidentiary problem. Calling
attention to the Wolf case 6 and the Weeks case 7, Justice Harlan concluded that" . . . this Court has hitherto taken the view that the
states should be left free to follow or not the federal exclusionary
rule . . . The present decision . . . (is) a step in the opposite and
wrong direction."
COMMENT

The path of the instant case, and the various theories adopted
by the courts in which it was argued have been set forth above in
some detail in order to illustrate the problems presented. Also, the
case gives rise to many implications which are worthy of consideration.
EVnhENTIARY PROBLEM

Until about 70 years ago, the fact that evidence was obtained
by an illegal search was no objection to its admissibility, and that
is still the rule in a slight majority of the states.8 However, in
Boyd v. United States,9 the Federal Supreme Court ruled that certain documents unlawfully obtained from the accused by a federal
officer were not admissable in evidence in a federal court as a consequence of the Fourth Amendment.
The Boyd ruling remained unquestioned in the federal courts
for eighteen years, but received frequent disfavor in the state courts.
Colorado, for example, despite the provisions in the State Constitution securing freedom "from unreasonable search and seizure",10
approved the common-law doctrine of admissibility, indicating that
a sufficient remedy existed in favor of the one against whom the
illegal search had been made, viz., an action for trespass."
Then, in Adams v. New York," in 1904, the exclusionary doctrine was virtually repudiated in the United States Supreme Court,
and the orthodox rule of admissibility adopted by a majority of the
state courts was expressly approved.
Next, in 1914, in the Weeks case, the Supreme Court, motivated
by what Professor Wigmore has termed "misplaced sentimentality,' 3 swung back to the doctrine of the Boyd case, but with a
condition, viz., that timely motion for the return of the articles
6 Wolf v. Colorado, 117 C. 279, 187 P. 2d, 926; 69 S. Ct. 1359, 338 U. S. 25 (1949).
7 Weeks v. United States, 34 S. Ct. 341, 232 U. S. 383, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914).
8 McCormick on Evidence 291, (1954).
9 116 U. S. 616, 6 S Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886).
10 Colo. Const. Art. I, S. 7.
21 Roberts v. The People, 78 C. 555, 243 P. 544 (1926).
12 24 S. Ct. 372, 192 U. S. 597, 48 L. Ed. 575 (1904).
188 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2184 (Third Ed. 1940).
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seized be made prior to trial. Since 1914 the federal courts have
adhered to the exclusionary rule.
Justice Cardozo, later to become a leading figure on the Supreme Court, while a member of the New York bench described the
effect of the Weeks doctrine in this manner:14 "The criminal is to
go free because the constable has blundered."'
The Supreme Court has had many opportunities to re-examine
its oft-criticized Weeks doctrine in recent years.
In the Wolf case, the Court refused to extend the doctrine to
evidence seized by a state officer and used to obtain a conviction in
a state court, although such evidence would have been inadmissible
in a federal court if seized by a federal officer on the basis of the
Fourth Amendment.
15
In Irvine v. People of State of California,
the same result was
reached, the Court holding firm to the position that the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence by a state court in trial of a
state offense did not violate the "due process of law" required by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Rochin v. People of California,'6 however, the Court indicated that the rule recognizing admissibility in a state court of evidence seized unlawfully had certain limitations. Thus, where it
appeared that state officers used a stomach pump on an accused
person to obtain evidence which was later used in the state prosecu41People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 413, 150 N. E. 585 (1926).
1574 S. Ct. 381, 347 U. S. 128, 98 L. Ed. 561 (1954).
1672 S. Ct. 205, 342 U. S. 165, 96 L. Ed. 183 (1952).
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tion, a judgment of conviction was reversed. The standard applied
was whether the actions of the officers would "shock the conscience
of the court." In the Rochin case, it was felt that the procedure did
just that.
The state of the law, prior to the Rea case may be summarized
in this fashion: (1) Generally, evidence illegally obtained by a
state officer is constitutionally admissible in a federal court on the
basis that "in the federal courts state officers are considered as
strangers," 17 and thus the Fourth Amendment does not run against
them. (2) Generally, evidence illegally obtained by a federal officer is constitutionally admissible against one prosecuted in a state
court. 8 (3) Generally, evidence illegally obtained by a state officer
is constitutionally admissible against one prosecuted in a state
court. 19 (4) Generally, evidence illegally obtained by a federal officer is constitutionally inadmissible in a federal court prosecution,
since "the effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of
the United States and Federal officials ...under limitations and restraints . .

Examining the Rea case in the light of the above decisions, the
conclusion is inevitable that the case is not, on its face, significant.
In its terms it is not directly analagous to either the Wolf or Irvine
cases, since federal officers were not involved in those cases. Nor
can it be said that the Stefanelli case comes within its terms, despite the violation of the federal act in that case. While it may be
noteworthy that the majority in the Stefanelli case ruled that "the
federal courts should refuse to intervene in State criminal proceedings to suppress the use of evidence even when claimed to have
been secured by unlawful search and seizure," it is clear in the Rea
case that the facts are sufficiently different to account for the application of a different standard. The rule in the SteJanelli case
should be restricted to the facts out of which it arose, namely, an
illegal search by state officers for use in a state court.
However, it is submitted that the case is indicative of a frame
of mind which someday will bring the Fourth Amendment within
the concept of "due process" under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In other words, the protection of "due process" against state action
will not be limited to "procedures which shock the conscience of the
court," but rather to all searches and seizures violative of an individual's rights.
PROBLEM OF PUBLIC POLICY

The minority doctrine of exclusion, as set forth in the Weeks
case, has been criticized as an inexcusable obstruction of the administration of justice, in that it aids only the guilty.
The problem appears to be principally one of interpretation,
either of the Fourth Amendment, of State constitutional provisions,
or of federal or state statutory enactments. It is a question of inter1720 Am Jur 358, Evidence s 397.
18 Terrano v. State, 59 Ney. 247, 91 P. 2d 67 (1939); contra, Edwards v. State, 83 Okla. Cr.
Ct. of Appeals 177, 177 P. 2d 143 (1947).
19 Stein v. New York, 73 S. Ct. 1077, 346 U. S. 156, 98 L. Ed. 362 (1953); Imboden Y. People,
40 C. 142, 90 P. 608 (1907).
-0 Weeks v. United States, 34 S. Ct. 341, 232 U. S. 383, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914).
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pretation because the various provisos prohibit illegal searches and
seizures, but make no mention of the evidence problem.
The cases indicate, especially those in which opinions by Justice
Douglas have been written, that considerations of policy have
entered into the Court's deliberations.
Dissenting in the Stefanelli case, for example, Justice Douglas
referred to his dissent in the Wolf case, and affirmed his position
that "to hold that the evidence may be admitted and . . . that its

use may not be enjoined is to make the Fourth Amendment an
empty and hollow guarantee so far as state prosecutions are concerned."
His language is strikingly similar to the language in the Weeks
case, namely that "the tendency of those who execute the criminal
laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful
seizures ...

should find no sanction in the judgment of the courts."

Significant also, we think, is the language in Shinyu Noro v.
United States,2 1 that "it is a federal judicial policy not to allow
agents and officers of the United States to break the law themselves
and then use information so acquired to prosecute others."
Again, in Silverthrone Lumber Co. v. United States,22 the Supreme Court used like language in pointing out that the essence of
a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way
was not merely that the evidence so acquired should not be used
before the court, but that it should not be used at all.
Professor Wigmore, however, criticizes what he refers to as "the
indirect and unnatural method" resulting in exclusion, drawing the
following analogy: 23
Titus, you have been found guilty

. . .;

Flavius, you

have.., violated the constitution. Titus ought to suffer imprisonment for crime, and Flavius for contempt. But no!
We shall let you both go free. We shall not punish Flavius
directly, but shall do so by reversing Titus' conviction.
This is our way of teaching people like Flavius to behave,
and incidentally of securing respect for the Constitution.
Our way of upholding the Constitution is not to strike at
the man who breaks it, but to let off somebody else who
broke something else.
However, it is submitted that Professor Wigmore has taken an
erroneous view of the actualities of the problem. Titus does not
go free, but must face a new trial. And Flavius, if Congress or the
legislature so wishes to provide, faces a penalty for his wrongful
action. And, what is more important, Titus will not be deprived of
his liberty by methods which "smell of the Star Chamber," but
only by methods consonant with the traditional concepts of
fair play as embodied in the "due process" concept.
The conclusion of Justice Douglas in the Rea case is that the
policy designed to protect the privacy of the citizen "is defeated if
the federal agent can flaunt .

.

. (the Rules) and use the fruits of

his unlawful act either in federal or state proceedings."
21 148 F. 2d 696 (Fifth Cir. 1945).
22 40 S. Ct. 182, 251 U. S. 385, 64 L. Ed. 319 (1920).
23 8 Wigmore on Evidence, s 2184 (Third Ed. 1940).
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It is submitted that the Rea case is correct in answering in the
affirmative the underlying policy inquiry, namely, whether one
who may be guilty of a crime should be allowed to go free when the
proof of his alleged guilt has been unlawfully obtained.
In the Rea case, the petitioner moved, as indicated above, under
Rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to suppress
the illegally obtained evidence. The rules read:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
may move the district court ... to suppress for use as evidence anything so unlawfully obtained . . . If the motion is

granted the property... shall not be admissible in evidence
at any hearing or trial.
From the cases have arisen two basic premises: First, the
general rule is that a return or supression of evidence can be ordered by a federal court where and only where the property is in
the possession of a federal officer. And secondly, state officers acting under state process cannot be compelled by a federal court to return articles taken from the prisoner. This latter view is consistent
with the rulings of the Federal Supreme Court refusing to include
the first eight amendments to the Federal Constitution within the
concept of "due process" in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus, it appears clear that the Rule can be applied only against
a federal officer. But is the phrase "any hearing" to be similarly
construed to apply only to a federal hearing?
Indicative of the answer is the construction given a similar provision in the Federal Immunity Act of 1954,24 which provides that
testimony compelled under the act cannot be used "as evidence in
any criminal proceeding... in any court."
In Adams v. State of Maryland,25 and more recently in Ullman
v. United States,26 the provision was construed as binding upon state
as well as federal courts, thus reversing what had been considered
settled law, namely, that neither federal nor state enactments granting immunity from prosecution were capable of being applied to the
government other than that which enacted it.
Therefore, the conclusion seems inevitable that Rule 41 (e) is
24 18 U. S. C. A. 3486.
25 74 S. Ct. 442, 347 U. S. 179, 98 L. Ed. 608 (1954).
2a76 S. Ct. 497, 350 U. S. 422 (1956).
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susceptible of an interpretation which will bind both federal and
state courts, insofar as the phrase "any hearing or trial" is concerned. The Rea case interpretation is only following where others
have trod before.
PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONALLY APPLYING RULE 41 (E) To FEDERAL
OFFICERS WHEN THE EFFECT IS TO INTERFERE WITH A STATE
PROSECUTION

From an analysis of our federal-state system of government, it
have no power
seems to follow that federal courts, as a general rule,
27
to enjoin actions or proceedings in a state court.
Indeed, the Federal Judicial Code expressly prohibits federal
courts from granting writs of injunction to stay proceedings in any
court of a state with but one exception not applicable to this discussion.
However, the provision does not prevent a Federal court from
would defeat or imenjoining proceedings in state courts which
-t
pair the jurisdiction of the Federal court.2
With this general background before us, an analysis of the argument of Justice Douglas in the Rea case indicates that his premise
is correct.
Most persuasive is the language of the Court is Wise v. Henkel,"'
in which it was held that:
.. it was within the power of the court to take jurisdiction of the subject of the return . . .as the result of its

inherent authority to consider and decide questions arising
before it concerning an alleged unreasonable exertion of
authority in connection with the execution of the process of
the court.
Again, the Supreme Court decided in Brown v. Walker,30 that
Congress could constitutionally provide immunity from prosecution
in state courts through its immunity laws.
It is clear that the granting of such immunity by Congress
could have the same effect upon a state action as Rule 41(e) had
in the Rea case.
And in the Ullman case the majority concluded: "Here the
State is forbidden to prosecute. But it cannot be contested that
Congress has power to provide for national defense arid the complementary power "To make all laws ...

necessary and proper for

carrying into execution the foregoing powers..."
Therefore, if the Federal government has the power to forbid
a state prosecution, can it reasonably be contended that it has not
the power to exercise jurisdiction over its officials when such will
only incidentally affect the state prosecution?
To answer this question affirmatively, one would have to
ignore the power of Congress "to ordain and establish inferior
27 28
29 Ex
29 31
30 16

Am Jut 401, Injunctions § 218.
porte Young, 28 S. Ct. 441, 209 U. S. 123, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908).
S. Ct. 599, 220 U. S. 556, 55 L. Ed 581 (1911).
S. Ct. 651, 161 U. S. 607, 40 L. Ed. 819 (1896).
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courts,"' 3 1 the Constitutional provision extending the judicial power
"to all cases, in law and equity, arising under . . . the laws of the

United States, ' 32 and the all engulfing "necessary and proper"83
clause of the Federal Constitution.
To conclude, it should be noted that Rule 41 (e) was a part of
the body of rules prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United
States and made effective only after submission to and approval by
Congress. Therefore, it seems clear that Congress, the policy-making body, has laid down "an intelligible principle" to which the inferior courts in this case are directed to conform. That Congress has
such power seems undeniable.
PROBLEM OF DELEGATION OF POWER

Justice Douglas, in the Rea case, stated that "the power of the
federal courts extends to policing .

.

. (the Rules) and making cer-

tain that they are observed."
The dissenting opinion latched on to the phrase, which appears
to be extraneous to the decision, and argued that this was the first
time that it had been suggested that the federal courts shared with
the executive branch responsibility for supervising law enforcement agencies as such.
Assuming, arguendo, the validity of the dissenting premise
under consideration, it is nonetheless well settled that "a statute is
not invalid as conferring executive powers where8 4the actual power
of the executive department is not diminished."
Here, it clearly appears that Congress, in enacting Rule 41 (e)
has not diminished in any real sense any powers previously vested
in the executive branch. Indeed, it only seems that quasi-executive
or administrative powers were given to the District Courts in an
incidental capacity, the real powers lying in the authorization to
determine when a search warrant had been improvidently issued,
and decreeing rights flowing from such unlawful action. Both of
these latter powers appear to be judicial, rather than executive, in
nature.
On these bases the conclusion follows that there has been no
real delegation of powers of a type forbidden by our system of government. Rather, there appears only to be an enhancing of the
judicial function, with no resulting loss of powers by any other
branch of the government.
PROBLEM OF ENCROACHMENT ON STATES' RIGHTS

As indicated in the materials above, and as pointed out in the
dissent in the Rea case, the problem of federal-state relationships

is one of the utmost significance. It is felt that this problem, perhaps
more than any other problem in the case, spotlights the myriad difficulties facing a court in resolving conflicting considerations.
Under the Federal Constitution, it seems clear that "the National Government may not, in the exercise of its powers, prevent a
state from discharging its ordinary functions of government. '35 But
31 U.

S. Const. Art. III, § 1.
828 U. S. Const. Art. III, § 2.
3 U. S. Const. Art. III, § 8, cl. 18.
34 11 Am Jut 888, Constitutional Low, § 189.
35 11 Am Jur 870. Constitutional Low, § 174.
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equally true is it that no state can interfere with the free and unembarrassed exercise by the Federal Government of all powers
possessed by it.
Many cases have illustrated the principle that the mere fact a
federal law has an adverse, incidental, effect upon states' rights will
not vitiate it.
Illustrative is Ex parte Siebold,36 in which the United States
Supreme Court held:
The regulations of Congress being constitutionally
paramount, the duties imposed thereby upon the officers of
the United States, so far as they respect the same matters,
must necessarily be paramount to those to be performed by
the officers of the state. If both cannot be performed, the
latter are pro tanto superseded and cease to be duties.
Regarding the effect of the Tenth Amendment, upon which
the dissent in the Rea case appears to be based, it should be noted
at the outset that the Amendment has been gradually limited in
scope and importance by the Supreme Court. And it was finally
reduced to an almost meaningless phrase in United States v. Darby, "7 in which it was held that "the Tenth Amendment .

.

. (does

not deprive) the national government of authority to resort to all
means for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate
and plainly adopted to the permitted end."
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court, in one of its earliest
s6 100 U. S. 371, 25 L. Ed. 717 (1880).
S761 S. Ct. 451, 312 U. S. 100, 85 L. Ed. 608 (1941).
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decisions concerning federal-state sovereignty, namely, the cele8
brated case of McCulloch v. Maryland,3
held that "states have no
power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in
any manner control the operations of the constitutional laws enacted
by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government."
It is significant to note that the majority opinion in the Stefanelli case conceded that "the power to grant the relief (against
a state officer using evidence in a state court obtained in violation
of a federal act)
the ... act."

...

may fairly and constitutionally be derived from

,iR
4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
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Equally significant, we think, is the fact that the Court of Appeals in the Rea case "assumed without deciding" that the court had
the authority under its general equity power to suppress the evidence.
And finally, even the dissent in the Rea case was forced to conclude that the "federal courts undeniably have the power to issue
an injunction in this case."
The majority opinion in the Stefanelli case, however, argued
quite persuasively that the granting of the motion to suppress would
disregard the power of courts of equity to exercise discretion "when
the balance is against the wisdom" of using such power.
It argued that:
. . . the considerations governing that discretion touch

perhaps the most sensitive source of friction between States
and Nation, namely, the active intrusion of the federal
courts in the administration of the criminal law for the
prosecution of crimes solely within the power of the States.
Discretionary refusal to exercise equitable power . . . is

one of the devices we have sanctioned for preserving this
balance.
Reference was also made in the Rea dissent to Douglas v. City
of Jeannette,39 in which the Supreme Court of the United States
held that
...courts of equity in the exercise of their discretionary
powers should (refuse) .

.

. to interfere with or embarass

threatened proceedings in state courts save in those exceptional cases which call for the interposition of a court of
equity to prevent irreparable injury which is clear and imminent.
It should be noted, this writer believes, that Rule 41 (e) in no
wise indicates that its provisions are to be enforced only in the discretion of the court. Rather, there is every reason to believe that
Congress, in setting forth the standards contained in the Rule, was
establishing a policy for federal agents, a policy which was to be
carried out by proper judicial action.
Secondly, even if the language of Rule 41 (e) be considered dis39 63 S. Ct. 877, 319 U. S. 157, 87 L. Ed. 1324 (1943).
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cretionary, it seems clear that a pending conviction in a state court
for a serious crime is "an irreparable injury which is clear and imminent" so as to come within the terms of the rule expressed in the
Douglas case.

That the federal-state relationship is perhaps altered may be
conceded. And that the state has again come away "second best"
in its continuing joust with the Nation may also be conceded. But
that the "authority of the United States government is supreme
in its cognizance of all subjects which the Constitution has committed to it,"40 is indisputable.
PROBLEM OF EQUITABLE INTERVENTION WHERE

A

LEGAL REMEDY Is

AVAILABLE

The general rule is that equity acts only where the remedy at
the "office of equity being to supply defects in
law is inadequate,
41
the law."
The Supreme Court of the United States has adopted the general rule in the expression that "equity jurisdiction will be sustained
unless the remedy at law is complete and will secure to the litigant
the whole right in a manner as'41just and perfect as that which is
attainable in a court of equity."
Thus, it appears clear that "it is not sufficient, in order to exlaw; such
clude the jurisdiction of equity, that
' 42 there be a remedy at
a remedy must also be adequate.

The traditional view has been that the use of illegally seized
evidence would not be enjoined because an "adequate" remedy
existed at law. Typical of the views of most jurisdictions, including
Colorado, 43 is the language in Williams v. State: "If the constituitonal rights of a citizen are invaded.. ., the most that any branch
of government can do is to afford the citizen such redress as is posand bring the wrongdoer to account for his unlawful consible, 44
duct.
It should be noted that in the Rea case, the Supreme Court
acted under its equity powers. And, it seems quite possible that
the Court has finally recognized the actualities of the situation,
namely, that affording civil redress for the trespass is not an adequate remedy for one who has been convicted of a crime on the
basis of evidence illegally taken from him.
It is submitted that the Rea case, if it stands for such a proposition, is in keeping with the best traditions of equity. An adequate
remedy for one who has been deprived of his liberty by means
violative of his constitutional rights is not afforded by allowing him
to slap the hand of the wrongdoer.
4011 Am Jur 40, Equity, § 3.
41 Clemente v. Macheboeuf, 92 U. S. 418, 23 L. Ed. 504 (1875).
42 19 Am Jur 109, Equity § 101. See also Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 53 S. Ct. 50, 287
U. 5. 92, 77 L. Ed. 185(1932); Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F. 2d. 112 (10th Cir. 1933); and
Denver & S.F.R. Co. v. Englewood, 62 C. 229, 161 P. 151 (1916).
48 People v. Kinnison, 94 C. 350, 30 P. 2d. 249 (1934).
44 100 Ga. 511, 28 S. E. 624 (1897).

September-October, 1956

DICTA

CONCLUSION

Legally, it is believed that the Rea ruling must be confined to
the facts out of which it arose. So confining it, the principal significance lies in the restriction it places upon the rule that evidence
illegally seized by federal officers is admissible in a state court,
viz., under a federal court judge, under Rule 41, feels the federal
officer acted unlawfully, even though the seizure "does not shock
the conscience of the court," or in any way violate state constitutional commands.
However, the real significance of the case appears to lie in its
rationale, which quite clearly indicates many revolutionary changes
may be expected regarding the solution to old problems as analyzed
with the new light of the Rea case.
Among the changes which may be expected is the inclusion
within the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the prohibitions contained in the Fourth, and probably the eventual
inclusion of the first eight amendments within the concept, thereby overruling the Wolf and Irvine cases.
Secondly, it seems probable that the federal courts will take
a dim view of the argument that the application of the exclusionary
rule to the states will result in an obstruction of justice, insofar as
it will limit the means which may be used to reach the desired end.
That there are considerations of public policy and a tradition of
180 years of "silent acquiescence" by the federal government is true,
but equally true and more persuasive is it that we appear to be in
a "laissez-faire" era regarding the protection of individual liberties.
Thirdly, the Rea case may indicate an increased activity upon
the part of Congress in enacting legislation, the ultimate effect of
which will result in increased federal powers and decreased state
powers.
Fourthly, increased assertions of equitable jurisdiction by the
federal courts may be seen, in order that an adequate remedy may
be provided according to the actuality of the situation, rather than
according to some theoretical concept having no real basis in fact.
Finally, that the Constitution will continue to receive an increasingly broad interpretation, thereby enhancing the powers of
the three branches of the federal government seems clear. That the
powers of the states will thereby be reduced may be argued, but it
seems that there is little left upon which the government of the
United States can encroach, since, in view of the Darby case, the
states today appear to be merely in the position of "residuary
legatees."
If the securing of personal liberties weakens the powers and
rights of the state, then perhaps the Rea decision constitutes an
encroachment upon states' rights. But it should be pointed out that
the Tenth Amendment also secures to the people those powers not
delegated in the Constitution to the federal government. The Tenth
Amendment being what it is today, we will accept an incidental encroachment upon non-existent state rights, in order that a more
perfect individual freedom may be realized!
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Will a judgment of conviction rendered in a criminal prosecution be admitted in evidence by the Colorado courts in a purely civil
action to establish the truth of the facts on which such judgment
was rendered? The answer to this question necessarily involves a
careful consideration of two Colorado cases.1 The earlier of the two,
wherein such evidence was admitted, was decided in 1937. The
latter case, decided in 1955, held such evidence to be inadmissible.
The purpose of this discussion is to attempt to propound from the
two decisions a rule of future practical applicability.
In North River Inc. Co. v. Militello,2 the insured pleaded not
guilty and was convicted on a charge of burning the insured property. Before trial on the criminal charge the insured sued the insurance company to recover on the policy. The record of the criminal action, then pending on review, was admitted in evidence in
the civil action for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the
insured. After judgment on the insured's conviction had become
final the insurance company moved in arrest of, and to vacate the
judgment rendered for the insured in the civil action, upon the
ground that the conviction as affirmed was a final and irrevocable
determination of the fact that the property had been destroyed in
fraud of the insurer, precluding recovery against the defendant company. The motion was overruled by the trial court. However, the
Supreme Court held that denial of the motion was error, vacated
the judgment, and entered an order for a new trial. In doing so,
the Court said that logic compelled a relaxation of the long-followed
rule of complete exclusion of evidence of a criminal conviction in
such cases, and that greater weight should be given to the evidence
when the fact of guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt in
a trial in which the accused was surrounded by all the safeguards
afforded by law. Moreover, the Court felt that this was particularly
true when the occasion, as in the instant case, bore a close relation to
an inter-party matter in that the defendant in the criminal action
was convicted of defrauding the insurance company by the identical
1 In this connection, it is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Holland was the author of both
opinions.
2 100 Cola. 343, 67 P. 2d. 625 (1937).
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act resulting in the loss upon which he predicated his claim for recovery against the same company. The Court stated: 3
The record of conviction in the criminal case was admissible in evidence in this case, and when so admitted
carried proof of the conviction to be considered as prima
facie evidence of the fact that plaintiff destroyed or caused
to be destroyed the property for which he now seeks to recover judgment in the amount of the insurance thereon.
It is such presumptive proof as to shift the burden to him
to establish his innocence thereof. When the established
fact of guilt was presented upon the first opportunity, as
here, it was sufficient to vitiate the civil judgment otherwise established.
By virtue of the Militello decision, it would seem that Colorado had in 1937, joined what Professor McCormick terms "the
growing minority" of jurisdictions which have come to insist that
"common sense and consistency of adjudication require that a judgment of conviction, offered against the person convicted in a later
civil action involving some of the same issues (should) be '4admitted
as evidence of the facts on which the judgment was based."
The Militello case rested tranquilly in the Colorado Reports
until 1955, when one Moyle sued defendant Brown for the wrongful
3 100 Colo. 343 at p. 347, 67 P. 2d. 625 at p. 627 (1937).
4 McCormick on Evidence, p. 618 (1954).
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death of Moyle's minor son, alleging that Brown had caused the
death of the child by driving an automobile in such a wantonly
reckless manner as to strike the child, who was riding a bicycle on a
public street.5 At the trial, copies of an information charging Brown
with manslaughter in the killing of the child, and a copy of the
verdict finding him guilty of that charge were admitted over the
objection of Brown, who had entered a plea of not guilty in the
criminal action. The trial court, relying on the Militello case, directed a verdict for the plaintiff, leaving only the question of
damages to the jury. The Supreme Court reversed on the ground
that the admission of copies of the information and of the verdict
finding Brown guilty of manslaughter was error. The Court stated:6
The courts are almost unanimous in ruling that such
evidence, being evidence of the conviction of a traffic charge
of manslaughter based on the operation of an automobile in
a civil case is inadmissible. (Emphasis supplied).
The only case law cited in support of the proposition that evidence of the prior criminal conviction was inadmissible was the
West Virginia case of Interstate Dry Goods v. Williamson 7 and the
A. L. R. annotation to that case.8 Oddly enough, the Williamson
case, to be discussed in more detail hereafter, in no way involved
the operation of an automobile. The annotation following the case
does state that the general rule "supported by the great weight of
authority" is that a judgment of conviction or acquittal rendered
in a criminal prosecution cannot be given in a purely civil action,
to establish the truth of the facts on which it was rendered. However, in a more recent annotation by the same authority, it is stated
that while the earlier cases justified the statement of a general rule
of exclusion, the modern tendency seems to be to abandon any such
general rule applicable to all criminal judgments. Moreover, it is
stated that an increasing number of decisions have approved the
admission of such evidence on the ground that the safeguards afforded the accused under criminal procedure are greater than those
5 Val. 8, C. B. A. Ad. Sh. No. 4, p. 131; 290 P. 2d. 1105 (1955).
6 Val. 8, C. B. A. Ad. Sh. No. 4 at p. 132, 290 P. 2d. 1105 at p. 1106 (1955)
791 W. Va. 156, 112 S. E. 301, 31 A. L. R. 258 (1922). (The report of the Moyle case, as it appears in the Advance Sheets, cites only the A. L. R. annotation following the West Virginia case.
However, the West Virginia case itself is cited in the Moyle opinion as reported in 290 P. 2d. 1105
at p. 1106.)
831 A. L. R. 261.
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in a civil action and that the convicted party therefore has no cause
for complaint when evidence of his criminal conviction is admitted
in the civil action. The latter annotation further points out that it
may reasonably be argued that evidence of convictions for minor
traffic violations should be excluded where the safeguards afforded
and a moderate fine
the accused may be more or less perfunctory,
may be accepted as a matter of convenience.9
Concerning minor traffic violations, the 1953 Colorado Revised
Statutes has a specific provision which is found under the chapter
entitled Automobiles and Other Motor Vehicles and which reads as
follows: 10

No record of the conviction of any person for any violation of this article shall be admissible as evidence in any
court in any civil action.
However, in the Moyle case the prior crime was manslaughter.
The fact that, while in the commission of that crime, Brown may or
may not also have been guilty of one or more minor traffic violations, would seem to be merely incidental insofar as the applicability of the foregoing statutory provision is concerned. Possibly
the Court entertained this view, since the Moyle opinion makes no
reference whatever to the above statute.
The Williamson case, previously referred to as being the only
case law cited in the Moyle opinion, held that in a civil suit to recover the value of certain property stolen from the plaintiff, the
record of a conviction of the defendant of the larceny of the property was not competent evidence to establish the fact that the defendant stole the property. The most remarkable aspect of the
Williamson case is that at the time the Supreme Court of West
Virginia considered the question the criminal conviction had already been reversed and the prosecution dropped altogether by the
prosecutor." Consequently, this holding would appear to be rather
dubious authority for the rule of exclusion, since the fact was that
there was then no existing judgment of conviction for the Court
to exclude.
The Moyle decision does not expressly overrule the Militello
case. On the contrary, the Militello case is not mentioned in the
9 18 A. L. R. 2d. 1289, 1290.
1o 13-4-140, '53 C. R. S.
'91 W. Va. 156, 112 S. E. 301 at p. 302, 31 A. L. R. 258 at p 259, 260 (1922)
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Moyle opinion, despite the fact that in a very well-written brief
to the Supreme Court counsel for Moyle relied heavily on the
earlier holding. Since the Moyle opinion does not refer to the
Militello decision, it follows that both rules must now be the law
in Colorado. That being so, it becomes necessary to distinguish
two rules which, at first blush, appear to be contradictory.
Regardless of the language in the Moyle opinion, it is not
probable that the Court intended to convey the impression that the
crime of manslaughter is a minor traffic violation. Nor is it likely
that the Court intended to infer that merely because the instrumentality used in the commission of such crime was an automobile,
that the crime is therefore magically transformed into a minor
traffic violation. The reason usually advanced for the rule of
exclusion where a traffic violation is involved is that the traffic
court proceeding is generally somewhat perfunctory, and the judgment rendered is otten the result of expediency or compromise."
In the Moyle case the prior criminal conviction of Brown came only
after a tiial by jury in a court of record." The criminal trial was
neither perfunctory nor was the verdict the result of expediency
or compromise. Therefore, the reason for the rule in regard to
traffic cases would seem to be absent here, even if it be conceded
that manslaughter with an automobile is nothing more than a
minor traffic violation.
The leading cases which have adopted the rule of admissibility
have generally involved the situation where a convicted criminal,
as the plaintiff, seeks by a civil action to take advantage of his
own wrong. Consequently, there has been some tendency to regard
14
It is to be
the rule as limited to that particular state of facts.
observed that in the Militello case the convicted criminal was the
plaintiff and was seeking to recover on an insurance policy covering
the building which he had been convicted of burning. On the other
hand, in the Moyle case the convicted criminal was the defendant
and was endeavoring to avoid the payment of damages arising frbm
his criminal act. It is often said that sound public policy will not
12 18 A... R. 2d. 1289, 1290. See also the commentary found in the Uniform
Rule 63 (20).
13 Criminal File No. C-1366, District Court in and for Adams County.
14 18 A. L. R. 2d. 1289.
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permit a wrongdoer to profit by his own wrong. This rule is clearly
applicable to the facts of the Militello case and probably justifies
the admission of evidence of the prior criminal conviction. It is
arguable that the rule is not applicable to the Moyle case because
Brown was not seeking to "profit" but was merely defending
against a civil action brought by the injured party. The troublesome question which this argument raises is: Has not the convicted criminal "profited" if he is saved from paying the damages
attendant to his criminal act?
Nevertheless, as previously stated, there is some tendency in
cases of this nature to admit the evidence of a prior conviction
when the criminal is seeking to collect damages but to exclude such
evidence where the criminal is attempting to avoid paying damages.
While the logic behind this view may be debatable, the fact remains
that some courts are inclined to place this limitation upon the
rule of admissibility.
Assuming that our Supreme Court intended by the Moyle ruling
to join the ranks of those courts who. enforce the above-discussed
limitation, then that decision merely limits the scope and application of the Militello case. If so, the two cases may be said to
stand for the following proposition: Where a convicted criminal
sues to collect damages for an injury resulting from his crime, the
record of his prior criminal conviction will be admitted in the
subsequent civil action as evidence of the fact that he committed
the crime, the reason for the rule being that public policy will
not permit a wrongdoer to profit by his own wrong. But where
the convicted criminal is sued by the party injured as the result of
the crime, such evidence will not be admitted because the wrongdoer will not be deemed to be seeking to profit by his own wrong.
One further distinction between the two cases under consideration probably deserves notice: In the Militello case the
crime involved (arson) was one requiring a specific affirmative
criminal intent; whereas, in the Moyle case, the crime in question
(manslaughter) was not one requiring actual intent. This distinction would seem to be of little legal significance, unless the
question of admissibility of evidence in such a situation is to be
determined on the basis of the degree of badness of the party
concerned. No cases from other jurisdictions have been found
which express any such distinction. However, it may be that the
Supreme Court of Colorado was impressed with the difference in
the degree of culpability between Militello and Moyle and therefore decided the two cases on some theory of moral turpitude.
Nevertheless, the later case does not give any indication that such
a distinction was intended.
This discussion began with the stated purpose of resolving
from the Moyle and Militello cases a rule capable of general application. The foregoing analysis seems to indicate that no such rule
can be formulated-only future decisions by the Colorado courts
can determine the true rule in Colorado.
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REPORT OF THE CORPORATION, BANKING AND
BUSINESS LAW COMMITTEE TO THE COLORADO
BAR ASSOCIATION BOARD OF GOVERNORS
at Aspen, Colorado - September 7, 1956
The Committee hereby submits to the Board of Governors,
with unqualified recommendation for its approval, the Colorado Business Corporation Act
as studied and drafted by your
Committee during the past eight
months.
In general, the proposed new
corporate statute is based upon
the 1953 revision of the Model
Business Corporation Act adopted by the American Bar Association and
supplemented by
further revisions,
alternative
provisions, and optional sections
adopted by the Committee of
Corporate Laws of the American
Bar Association in 1955.
Robert S. Gast, Chairman
The corporation law of the
State of Colorado has been amended from time to time in a piece
meal fashion in an effort to modernize the law and bring our corporate statutes to date. A good example of this is the various
amendments to the corporate law found in the 1955 Session Laws
of Colorado. Although such amendments have served in part to
broaden and liberalize Colorado corporate law, they have done
little to clarify the meaning of our statutes on such important
problems as dividends, the ultra vires doctrine, and the protection
of corporate names. Much of the present Colorado law on corporations is vague and confusing. Some provisions serve no legitimate
purpose in modern corporate practice. Some law which should be
clearly defined by statute is omitted.
In your Committee's opinion the proposed Colorado Business
Corporation Act is far superior to the present Colorado Statutes.
It retains much of the concise, clear wording of the Model Business
Corporation Act of the A.B.A., which has now been adopted with
amendments as the statutory law of Wisconsin (1951), Oregon
(1952), District of Columbia (1954), Texas (1955), and Virginia
(1956). Where Colorado law or practice appeared preferable to
those policies set forth in the Model Code, we have retained such
sections in the proposed statute submitted to you. Where the
Model Code overlapped into other fields of law, such as taxation
and titles to real estate, your Committee has consulted with the
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Colorado Bar Association Committee on Taxation and Real Estate
Standards to obtain recommendation on franchise taxes, license
fees, filing fees, and recording data for title examination. We have
incorporated the best of such recommendations into the final draft..
It would be impossible in this report to discuss in detail each
provision of the proposed Act and analyze it as to existing Colorado
law. However, we should like to highlight certain portions of
the Act as it modifies and clarifies existing Colorado law, and then
explain in general certain features of the Model Act which the
Committee has deleted as being contrary to modern corporate
practice in Colorado.
Under the proposed Act, Corporations may be organized for
any lawful purpose excepting banks, insurance companies, savings
and loan associations, non-profit and religious corporations, and
those special corporations such as mining, ditch and reservoirs,
and title and guaranty companies which are governed by specific
statutes applying to particular corporations. However, it is made
clear that the proposed Act shall apply to corporations of every
class and character to the extent the Act is not inconsistent with
the special corporate statutes.
Under the proposed Act, corporations have broad general
powers, including the power to operate and own property outside
the State of Colorado, and the Act specifically provides that such
powers granted by statute need not be set forth in the Articles of
Incorporation. This, of course, changes existing Colorado law in
that a corporation cannot operate out of the State unless the
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Articles of Incorporation so provide, and then it is necessary to
state where the books and stock records will be kept. In connection with corporate powers, your Committee broadened the Model
Act by incorporating in the proposed Act the power of the corporate entity to enter into partnerships, joint ventures, syndicates,
and the like.
The proposed Act provides that ultra vires acts by officers and
directors of a corporation shall not invalidate contracts or conveyances. For such ultra vires acts, the statute provides three
remedies: (a) a cause of action by the corporation against the
officers and directors; (b) the Attorney General may dissolve the
corporation; (c) the injured party may get damages in an action
for injunction before performance of the contract. This modification of the common law doctrine prohibits a corporation from
voiding its own contracts with innocent third parties.
Under the proposed Act each domestic and foreign corporation
must maintain a registered office and registered agent in the State
of Colorado and process may be served on the registered agent
or, if he cannot be found, upon the Secretary of State. However,
this is not exclusive and process may also be served in the manner
provided by the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure.
In the proposed Act, promissory notes and future services
are excluded as consideration for the issuance of stock either as
payment or part payment for such stock. The preemptive right
to subscribe for additional stock is made specifically applicable
to treasury shares as well as unissued shares and may be limited
or denied to the extent provided in the articles of incorporation
and a corporation may issue or sell shares of stock to officers and
employees without like offering to the other shareholders on terms
approved by two-thirds of the shareholders entitled to vote.
The proposed Act abolishes the necessity for the publication
in a newspaper of a notice of special or annual stockholders' meetings and provides merely for the mailing of a written notice of
such meetings not less than ten and not more than fifty days before
said meetings.
Although the Model Act as originally adopted made cumulative
voting mandatory, your Committee in the proposed Act has made
this permissive only to the extent set forth in the articles of incor-
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poration, and has made appropriate amendments to the Model
Act so that cumulative voting is denied when the articles of incorporation are silent as to this right.
The proposed Act leaves the number and election of directors
up to the bylaws of the corporation unless otherwise provided in
the Articles of Incorporation with the proviso that vacancies created
by amending the bylaws to increase the number of directors must
be filled by the stockholders rather than the directors as under
present Colorado law.
Under the Model Act, dividends may be declared and paid
only out of the unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus of
the corporation. Your Committee decided to liberalize this provision in accordance with other state statutes, such as Illinois, and
incorporate a provision whereby dividends may be paid out of
paid-in surplus or surplus arising from the surrender to the corporation of any of its shares, or surplus arising from the reduction
of par value of any outstanding stock. Although under the proposed
Act and present Colorado law it is illegal for the board of directors
to declare a dividend when the corporation is insolvent, the Committee removed from the present Colorado law the joint and several
personal liability of directors for all debts of the corporation arising
from the declaration of such illegal dividend.
The Model Act prohibits loans by the corporation to its officers
and directors and makes the directors individually liable for the
amount of any such loan to an officer or director. Your Committee
believed that as a practical matter, many small closely-held corporations often make loans to the officers and directors, and such
practice was unobjectionable. The Committee thus deleted this
restrictive provision from the proposed Act.
The proposed Act provides that only a person who has been
a shareholder of record for six months and who shall be the holder
of at least 5% of all outstanding shares of the corporation shall
have the unlimited right to inspect the books and records of the
corporation. However, any shareholder may apply to any court for
permission to inspect the books and records of a corporation for
a legitimate purpose. This appears more desirable than present
Colorado laws which permit any stockholder to demand access to
the books and records of a corporation. Also, the proposed Act
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permits any stockholder to request the most recent financial statement of a corporation whereas present Colorado law grants this
right only to a shareholder owning 15% or more of the capital stock
of the corporation.
Your Committee has also deemed it wise to delete from the
proposed Act those provisions of the Model Act which require
$1000 paid-in capital before the corporation can begin its business.
Broad powers of amendment are included within the proposed
Act and it is possible to amend the articles of incorporation to
change the objects and purposes of the corporate entity. We have
changed the Model Act to permit stockholders as well as directors
to instigate action on amendments to the articles by calling the
necessary stockholders' meeting.
The proposed Act separates the merger or consolidation of
inter-domestic corporations from domestic with foreign corporations. The result is that both situations are much clearer than
under present Colorado law, and existing conflicts are eliminated
as to the number of shareholders required to approve the merger
or consolidation. Under the proposed Act, the dissenting shareholder must make his written demand for payment within 10 days
after the vote is taken on the merger or consolidation. Value of his
stock is determined as of a day prior to the vote upon the merger
or consolidation, and if value cannot be agreed upon, Courts are
resorted to rather than three appraisers as under present Colorado
law. This serves to shorten the time for the dissenting stockholder
to make his demands known and alleviates the unfair benefit of
the "wait and see" period now existing under Colorado law.
The proposed Act arms the State of Colorado with the weapon
of involuntary dissolution in the event the corporation exceeds
its authority, fails to appoint a registered agent, or fails to pay
its franchise tax or make annual reports. The Committee has
deleted from the proposed Act provisions of present Colorado law
relating to $1000 liability of officers and directors at the suit of
any creditor and relating to stay of proceedings on motion of an
adversary being sued by the corporation where the corporation
has failed to file annual reports. The Committee has retained the
provision for the Secretary of State to declare a corporation defunct
and inoperative upon failure to pay franchise taxes or make annual
reports for a period of two years.
With the approval of the Secretary of State of Colorado, your
Committee has drastically changed the franchise tax, license fees,
and filing fees for domestic and foreign corporations. The proposed
Act abolishes the present Colorado license fees and the license fees
proposed by the Model Code. It was felt that license fees duplicated the proposed annual franchise tax. The filing fees for articles
of incorporation were established at $25 for all corporations regardless of size of the corporation or authorized capitalization. The
annual franchise tax for all corporations was established at $20,
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regardless of the size of the corporation or its authorized capital.
Your Committee has been assured that these uniform fees and
taxes will not result in any decreased revenue to the State of
Colorado. Collection of the franchise tax by the Colorado Department of Revenue by applying the first $20 paid by a corporation
on its Colorado State Income Tax to the Secretary of State for
franchise taxes and incorporating the annual report into the State
Income Tax Return was seriously considered, and although this
met with the approval of the Director of Revenue, your Committee
believed such a drastic innovation at this time should not be
incorporated in the proposed Act.
We have attempted here to cover only certain highlights of
the proposed Act. Space limitations prohibit outlining the treatment of foreign corporations, liquidations, dissolution, sale of assets
and other matters therein set forth. Suffice it to say that all such
subjects are covered with extreme clarity by the proposed Act
without basic fundamental changes of existing Colorado law.
I should like to express my deep appreciation to Charles A.
Baer, who acted as Secretary of the Committee; to the three
subchairmen, Keith Anderson, Harl G. Douglass and Martin Harrington, each of whom had the responsibility of analyzing in written
reports various portions of the Model Code; and to Claude Maer,
Richard M. Davis, Robert Charlton and other Denver members
of the Committee, who gave liberally of their time and experience
in drafting the proposed Act and proofreading the final product.
I am grateful for their assistance in making this report possible.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT S. GAST

Chairman of Corporation,
Banking, and Business Law
Committee
Keith Anderson
Charles A. Baer
Howard S. Bjelland
Leonard M. Campbell
R. D. Charlton
Richard M. David
Harl G. Douglass
Leslie A. Gifford
Martin J. Harrington
Charles M. Holmes
Philip C. Klingsmith
Irving Mehler
Howard K. Phillips
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VICE-PRESIDENT
Equitable Building
AC. 2-3811
L. Ward Bannister
Equitable Building
MA. 3-1245

Leonard L. Beal
Tramway Building
AC. 2-4619
Mandel Berenbaum
Equitable Building
AC. 2-3875
Thomas A. Gilliam
Midland Savings Building
TA. 5-0119
Victoria F. Gross
First National Bank Building
AC. 2-2759
Everett E. Smith
Majestic Building
AC. 2-9101

INSTITUTES COMMITTEE
James L. Treece
CHAIRMAN
Denver Club Building
AC. 2-2855

Douglas McHendrie
SUPERVISORY TRUSTEE
Equitable Building
TA. 5-5111

MARSOLEK'S RADIO & APPLIANCE STORES
Complete stock of RADIOS, SPORTING GOODS, ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES,
HARDWARE, TELEVISION SETS and PHONOGRAPH RECORDS
(Two Locations)

2606-10 EAST COLFAX

3539 EAST COLFAX

Across from East High
Fment 7-2764

TV Service Center
DExter 3-1595-6

Bring your Radio and TV to us for repair. Open Evenings-90 Day Guarantee
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David V. Dunklee
Ernest & Cranmer Building
KE. 4-7021
William H. Erickson
University Building
MA. 3-4189
Donald W. Hoagland
First National Bank Building
AL. 5-5475
Gerald M. Quiat
Symes Building
TA. 5-2238
Gordon Slatkin
University Building
AC. 2-2845
Charles E. Works
University of Denver College of Law
1445 Cleveland Place

Donald S. Stubbs
VICE-PRESIDENT
First National Bank Building
AL. 5-5475
George F. Barbary
Majestic Building
TA. 5-5405
Wynn M. Bennett, Jr.
Mile High Center
AL. 5-5251
H. Harold Calkins
Kittredge Building
AC. 2-8541
Theodore H. Chrysler
Colorado National Bank
Seventeenth and Champa
MA. 3-4121

JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
Martin J. Harrington
CHAIRMAN
Denver Club Building
KE. 4-0211
Mary C. Griffith
SUPERVISORY TRUSTEE
Midland Savings Building
AC. 2-5676

Donald S. Stubbs
VICE-PRESIDENT
First National Bank Building
AL. 5-5475
William L. Bromberg
University Building
AC. 2-2845
D. Tyner Brown
First National Bank Building
AL. 5-5475

DIRECT TELEPHONE LINE
SERVICE

SPEEDS *FOUR-COUNTY*

MA

3-1206

Record Abstract and
Title Insurance Co.
725- 18th St., Denver

BE

7-2756

Security Abstract Company
of Jefferson County
1595 Wadsworth, Lakewood

RECORD
ABSTRC N
TITLE INSUR C O
ESt.

19

*Denver -

*Adams -

*Arapahoe

-

*Jefferson

September-October, 1956
Norman H. Comstock
Attorney General's Office
State Capitol Building
KE. 4-1171
Warren 0. Martin
Judge Breitenstein's Clerk
Post Office Building
KE. 4-1840
Thomas E. McCarthy
Mile High Center
AM. 6-0303
William B. Miller
Equitable Building
AM. 6-0577
Luis D. Rovira
Telephone Building
AC. 2-1606

DICTA
Wantland L. Sandel, Jr.
First National Bank Building
CH. 4-5419
Benjamin F. Stapleton, Jr.
Denver Club Building
AM. 6-2631
Edwin P. Van Cise
Ernest & Cranmer Building
TA. 5-6246
John A. F. Wendt, Jr.
Denver Club Building
AC. 2-5751
Lucius E. Woods
Mile High Center
TA. 5-7231

JUNIOR BAR COMMITTEE
Philip A. Danielson
CHAIRMAN
Equitable Building
AM. 6-1461
Mary C. Griffith
SUPERVISORY TRUSTEE
Midland Savings Building
AC. 2-5676
Donald S. Stubbs
VICE-PRESIDENT
First National Bank Building
AL. 5-5475
Maxwell P. Aley
Colorado Building
AC. 2-7924
John V. Amato
Denver Club Building
KE. 4-0211
Kenneth E. Barnhill, Jr.
Equitable Building
AM. 6-1461
Richard C. Cockrell
Equitable Building
CH. 4-6603
Arthur M. Frazin
First National Bank Building
AC. 2-1535

Earl T. Greinetz
Symes Building
AM. 6-0226
Sanford B. Hertz
New Custom House
KE. 4-4151
Robert L. Nagel
Equitable Building
CH. 4-4541
Robert B. Rottman
University Building
AC. 2-9575
Robert W. Smedley
First National Bank Building
AC. 2-0621
Jerry N. Snyder
Kittredge Building
AM. 6-2129
Jack V. Temple
First National Bank Building
KE. 4-3147
James E. Turre
3011 South Broadway
SU. 9-1166
Harry W. Williams
1711 California Street
KE. 4-1251

Lunch With

the

Kocikybilt Sys4tem
of Denver

24 HOUR BREAKFAST AND LUNCH SERVICE
At 1649 Broadway

Denver
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LEGAL AID COMMITTEE
Frank P. Lynch, Jr.
CHAIRMAN
Majestic Building
CH. 4-5414
Mary C. Griffith
SUPERVISORY TRUSTEE
Midland Savings Building
AC. 2-5676
Donald S. Stubbs
VICE-PRESIDENT
First National Bank Building
AL. 5-5475
Sol L. Bloomfield
801 Kearney Street (Home Address)
FL. 5-5539 (Home phone)
J. Glenn Donaldson
Majestic Building
AC. 2-5807
John E. Fitzpatrick
Majestic Building
MA. 3-3350

Martin A. Kane
Symes Building
CH. 4-2853
Stevens Park Kinney
First National Bank Building
AL. 5-7637
L. Joseph Pittroff
69 Knox Court
WE. 5-4717
Vasco Seavy, Jr.
Post Office Building
KE. 4-4151
Sidney H. Tellis
Security Life Building
CH. 4-7476
Franklin A. Thayer
314 Fourteenth Street
AC. 2-0858
James W. Wilson
Ernest & Cranmer Building
AL. 5-3767

LEGAL SERVICE AND LAWYER REFERRALS COMMITTEE
Warren E. White
CHAIRMAN
600 Mile High Center
AM. 6-0303
Robert F. Welborn
SUPERVISORY TRUSTEE
Denver Club Building
AC. 2-5751
Donald S. Stubbs
VICE-PRESIDENT
First National Bank Bldg.
AL. 5-5475
James T. Bayer
Equitable Building
TA. 5-2327
Charles E. Bennett
1300 Cherokee
AM. 6-2727
Field C. Benton
Equitable Building
AM. 6-1461
Paul C. Brown
Equitable Building
TA. 5-2327

Hyman A. Coggan
Security Life Building
CH. 4-7476
George J. Duckworth
Colorado Building
AL. 5-8497
Julius I. Ginsberg
Majestic Building
TA. 5-7324
Clell W. Hardee
11231 East Colfax Avenue
Aurora, Colorado
EM. 4-2426
Robert E. LaRue
2427 South Broadway
SH. 4-2777
Blair J. Lawther
3035 East Colfax Avenue
DE. 3-4295
Alwin E. Riede
Mining Exchange Building
TA. 5-6154

LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE
Ira L. Quiat
CHAIRMAN
Symes Building
TA. 5-2238
0. Otto Moore
SUPERVISORY TRUSTEE
Supreme Court Chambers
State Capitol
KE. 4-1171

Frederick P. Cranston
VICE-PRESIDENT
Equitable Building
AC. 2-3811

September-October, 1956
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Executive

Joseph F. Dolan
Symes Building
KE. 4-5186
Charles H. Haines, Jr.
Equitable Building
TA. 5-5111
Lawrence M. Henry
Symes Building
KE. 4-5186

Donald W. Hoagland
First National Bank Building
AL. 5-5475
Donald M. Lesher
425 Midland Savings Building
AC. 2-7746
Royal C. Rubright
First National Bank Building
KE. 4-6135

General
John C. Banks
City & County Building
MA. 3-1133
Leonard M. Campbell
Equitable Building
AL. 5-4636
Eugene L. Deikman
Ernest & Cranmer Building
AL. 5-3767
Allen F. Dines
Mile High Center
TA. 5-7231
Charles M. Dosh
Kittredge Building
KE. 4-3193

Robert W. Hansen
Majestic Building
CH. 4-4389
Hubert D. Henry
Majestic Building
AC. 2-3644
Robert M. Johnson
Equitable Building
AC. 2-1611
John Fleming Kelly
Equitable Building
AM. 6-1461
Robert H. Kiley
Security Building
AM. 6-2066

Everything in K*ubtter Stamps
FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION

Personalized Service
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Howard W. Rea
First National Bank Building
AL. 5-5475
William F. Reynard
Kittredge Building
MA. 3-4138

September-October, 1956

Burton A. Smead, Jr.
Denver National Bank
AC. 2-2661
Jay W. Tracey, Jr.
Equitable Building
AM. 6-1461

MEMBERSHIP COMMITTEE
Francis S. Mancini
CHAIRMAN
Majestic Building
AL. 5-0483
Douglas McHendrie
SUPERVISORY TRUSTEE
Equitable Building
TA. 5-5111
Donald S. Stubbs
VICE-PRESIDENT
First National Bank Building
AL. 5-5475
Charles E. Bennett
1300 Cherokee Street
AM. 6-2727
Charles F. Cory
Majestic Building
KE. 4-7166

Lennart T. Erickson
Equitable Building
KE. 4-7259
Dwight A. Hamilton
Equitable Buiidnng
AM. 6-1761
Gordon Johnston, Dean
University of Denver Law School
1445 Cleveland Place
AL. 5-3441
Lloyd H. Stormo
Mile High Center
AM. 6-0303
Robert N. Trunk
Empire Building
CH. 4-5068
Henry J. Walsmith
846 East Eighteenth Avenue
AC. 2-8996

MEETINGS COMMITTEE
William G. Berge
CHAIRMAN
Majestic Building
AC. 2-9438

Robert F. Welborn
SUPERVISORY TRUSTEE
Denver Club Building
AC. 2-5751

Throw a line around your
TITLE and ABSTRACT Problems

Yes indeed! Whatever your title or abstract needs in Colorado, Title Guaranty Company and its affiliated companies
will provide complete service

...

and promptly!

The TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY
1711 CALIFORNIA STREET

KEystone 4-1251

Branch offices: JEFFERSON COUNTY ABSTRACT CO.
ARAPAHOE COUNTY ABSTRACT & TITLE CO.
LANDON ABSTRACT CO.

September-October, 1956
Donald S. Stubbs
VICE-PRESIDENT
First National Bank Building
AL. 5-5475
Richard J. Bernick
University Building
KE. 4-7288
0. Ben Bozeman
Mile High Center
AM. 6-1749
Wilbur F. Denious, Jr.
Denver Club Building
AC. 2-2277
Richard Downing, Jr.
Equitable Building
KE. 4-6271
Eugene A. Frantz
Equitable Building
MA. 3-6247
Willard H. Freeman
Ernest & Cranmer Building
TA. 5-3688

DICTA
Richard S. Kitchen
Equitable Building
AC. 2-1611
Hover T. Lentz
Equitable Building
AC. 2-1611
William R. Loeffler
3975 East 58th
AT. 8-0761
David L. Michael
First National Bank Building
TA. 5-1344
James H. Rogers
Midland Savings Building
AL. 5-5860
Ralph Sargent, Jr.
Gas & Electric Building
AC. 2-9451
Gerald M. Shea
Majestic Building
TA. 5-3525

MINIMUM FEES COMMITTEE
Donald C. McKinlay
CHAIRMAN
Mile High Center
TA. 5-7231
Douglas McHendrie
SUPERVISORY TRUSTEE
Equitable Building
TA. 5-5111
Donald S. Stubbs
VICE-PRESIDENT
First National Bank Building
AL. 5-5475
William P. Cantwell
Equitable Building
AM. 6-1461
Howard E. Erickson
Farmers Union Building
AC. 2-9424
Milton C. Garwood
Denver Club Building
AL. 5-2011

Eugene S. Hames
Denver Club Building
AL. 5-1736
Richard R. Helmick
Denver Club Building
AC. 2-5751
Royal R. Irwin
University Building
CH. 4-8687
Edward P. Kurz
Equitable Building
MA. 3-5254
Charles Rosenbaum
University Building
CH. 4-7414
John B. Tweedy
Mile High Center
AC. 2-0881

PUBLIC RELATIONS COMMITTEE
J. Donovan Stapp
CHAIRMAN
2815 Madison Street
FL. 5-4493
David Rosner
SUPERVISORY TRUSTEE
Symes Building
KE. 4-4644
Frederick P. Cranston
VICE-PRESIDENT
Equitable Building
AC. 2-3811
L. Ward Bannister
Equitable Building
MA. 3-1245

Honorable David Brofman
City & County Building
MA. 3-1133
Robert Bugdanowitz
Majestic Building
TA. 5-3326
Ivan D. Fugate
Majestic Building
AM. 6-2486
Honorable Philip B. Gilliam
City & County Building
MA. 3-1133
Charles H. Haines, Jr.
Equitable Building
TA. 5-5111

DICTA
Theodore H. Hammett
Denver Club Building
AM. 6-2461
Martin J. Harrington
Denver Club Building
KE.4-0211
Louis G. Isaacson
Mile High Center
TA. 5-3366
Honorable Mitchel B. Johns
City & County Building
MA. 3-1133
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Dolores B. Koplowitz
Majestic Building
CH. 4-4577
George N. Rainsford
2211 South Josephine Street
SH. 4-1811
Richard M. Schmidt, Jr.
425 Midland Savings Building
AC. 2-7746

REAL ESTATE COMMITTEE
Edwin J. Wittelshofer
CHAIRMAN
First National Bank Building
CH. 4-5419
Godfrey Nordmark
SUPERVISORY TRUSTEE
Equitable Building
TA. 5-2327

Frederick P. Cranston
VICE-PRESIDENT
Equitable Building
AC. 2-3811

Executive
L. H. Drath
First National Bank Building
MA. 3-4395
Golding Fairfield
First National Bank Building
KE. 4-6135
Gilbert Goldstein
Majestic Building
AC. 2-5807
Richard P. Hall
First National Bank Building
CH. 4-5419
Albert S. Isbill
1711 California Street
KE. 4-1251

Donald M. Lesher
425 Midland Savings Building
AC. 2-7746
Percy S. Morris
Security Life Building
CH. 4-7476
Simon Quiat
Equitable Building
TA. 5-1366
Warren K. Robinson
Equitable Building
TA. 5-1003

General
Donald D. Cawelti
Gas & Electric Building
AC. 2-9451
Charles F. Cory
Majestic Building
KE. 4-7166
James D. Doyle
First National Bank Building
MA. 3-4378
Charles R. Enos
Mile High Center
TA. 5-5256
Harry A. Feder
University Building
CH. 4-4225
Robert T. Haines
1726 Champa Street
AC. 2-5994

Leon E. Hayden, Jr.
3460 West 38 Avenue
GE. 3-3323
C. Blake Hiester, Jr.
Equitable Building
AC. 2-3737
L. Douglas Hoyt
Mile High Center
TA. 5-7231
William K. Malone
725 Eighteenth Street
MA. 3-1206
G. Michael Morris
First National Bank Building
AL. 5-3132
Richard M. Naylor
Ross Building
AC. 2-5801
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Saul Pinchick
Equitable Building
KE.4-6478
Harold E. Popham
Equitable Building
AC. 2-1611

DICTA
Howard Roepnack
7700 West 57 Avenue
HA. 4-4418
Morris E. Rutland
University Building
AC. 2-2845

TOPICAL LUNCHEONS COMMITTEE
John R. Griffith
CHAIRMAN
Equitable Building
TA. 5-8157
David Rosner
SUPERVISORY TRUSTEE
Symes Building
KE. 4-4644
Frederick P. Cranston
VICE-PRESIDENT
Equitable Building
AC. 2-3811
Harry S. Bernstein
University Building
KE.4-0237
John L. Griffith
Midland Savings Building
AC. 2-5676

Sanford B. Hertz
New Custom House
KE. 4-4151
Samuel M. Kirbens
Farmers Union Building
AM. 6-0621
Ben Klein
Ernest & Cranmer Building
KE. 4-3964
Royal C. Rubright
First National Bank Building
KE. 4-6135
Arthur M. Shooker
1045 Acoma Street
MA. 3-5738
Raymond J. Turner
Equitable Building
AC. 2-1611

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE COMMITTEE
Thomas M. Tierney
CHAIRMAN
Equitable Building
AC. 2-3737
Godfrey Nordmark
SUPERVISORY TRUSTEE
Equitable Building
TA. 5-2327
Frederick P. Cranston
VICE-PRESIDENT
Equitable Building
AC. 2-3811
Norman E. Berman
Symes Building
CH. 4-5403
Haslett P. Burke
1370 Grant Street
CH. 4-1119

Marvin Dansky
University Building
AM. 6-1422
Richard Downing, Jr.
Equitable Building
KE. 4-6271
Sherman G. Finesilver
3838 West 38 Avenue
GE. 3-3183
Maurice Reuler
Equitable Building
KE. 4-2523
Joe S. Reynolds
First National Bank Building
AM. 6-1312
Philip A. Rouse
Majestic Building
CH. 4-5414

Attorney's Business Always Welcomed
at the

RANCH HOUSE
ROSCOE ROBINSON, Manager
70 OF THE WEST'S FINEST MOTEL ROOMS
Denver, Colorado
PEarl 3-3781
1450 South Santa Fe

PROPOSAL FOR SELECTION OF JUDGES
Included as a separate mailing piece with this issue of
"Dicta" is a proposal in connection with the selection of
judges in Colorado. This proposal has been worked out by
the judiciary committee of the Colorado Bar Association in
cooperation with other interested groups. The proposal now
is in the hands of the legislative committee of the Colorado
Bar Association for final drafting.
Your suggestions and comments regarding the proposal
will be appreciated. Contact any member of the judiciary
committee in your area, or write direct to Merrill A. Knight,
chairman of the judiciary committee of the Colorado Bar
Association.
Members of the Colorado Bar Association judiciary committee include:
Merrill A. Knight, Midland Savings Building, Denver 2,
Colo.
Richard P- Brown, International Trust Co., Denver 2, Colo.
William E. Buck, Court House, Boulder, Colo.
Haslett P. Burke, 1370 Grant St., Denver 3, Colo.
Nicholas C. Dazzo, Trinidad, Colo.
George A. Epperson, First National Bank Building, Fort
Morgan, Colo.
Harold A. Grant, Bank Annex Building, Leadville, Colo.
James Groves, P. 0. Box 656 Grand Junction, Colo.
E. Ellison Hatfield, Jeffrey Building, Durango, Colo.
Gordon Hinds, City Hall, Pueblo, Colo.
Peter H. Holme, Mile High Center, Denver 2, Colo.
Donald T. Horn, Lamar, Colo.
Barnard Houtchens, 318 Greeley Building, Greeley, Colo.
Warren W. Lattimer, 444 Thatcher Building, Pueblo, Colo.
Harrison Loesch, P. 0. Box 387, Montrose, Colo.
Arthur E. March, Wilson Building, Fort Collins, Colo.
Clyde 0. Martz, University of Colorado School of Law,
Boulder, ColoRobert M. McCreery, First National Bank Building, Loveland, Colo.
Raphael Moses, Alamosa, Colo.
Harry S. Peterson, P. 0. Box 1594, Pueblo, Colorado.
George J. Robinson, 7314 W. Colfax Ave., Lakewood, Colo.
Harry Sayre, Trinidad, Colo.
Dale E. Shannon, 1427 W. Mountain Ave., Fort Collins,
ColoM. 0. Shivers, Jr., 9 W. Hampden Ave., Englewood, Colo.
Ben F. Stapleton, Jr., 420 Denver Club Building, Denver 2, Colo.
F. G. Stinemeyer, Canon City, Colo.
Fred A- Videon, First National Bank Building, Craig, Colo.
Mack Witty, Salida, Colo.
Kenneth M. Wormwood, 421 Symes Building, Denver 2,
Colo.

